Gender and Public Perceptions of Accountability for Insurgent Violence: The Case of ISIS Women in Iraq

Vera Mironova
Harvard University

Sam Whitt
High Point University

Abstract

This study examines public perceptions of female accountability for insurgency-related violence. Our field research draws on the case of women in the Islamic State (ISIS) in Mosul, Iraq. We evaluate public opinion regarding punishment of ISIS affiliated women using a case-control comparison of ordinary Mosul civilians to people with ISIS ties. We consider theoretical arguments for punishing ISIS women based on insurgency-related identity cleavages, beliefs about proportionality of punishment to crime, and patriarchal gender norms. Consistent with an emerging literature on gender and conflict, we find that Iraqi publics see women as agents in their own right and hold them accountable for violence alongside their male counterparts, in part because they ascribe blame to women for ISIS violence and see them as a future threat. Our research also has implications for whether ISIS women will be allowed to re-enter Iraqi society or face prospects of long-term stigma and abuse.

Introduction

To what extent do publics hold gendered views of justice and accountability for insurgent violence? Are women inside insurgencies perceived primarily as unwitting pawns and victims, as agents of violence in their own right, or some of both? Although the fate of many insurgents may be decided ultimately on the battlefield or in courts of law, public opinion about insurgent culpability and accountability may be important to ensuring that transitional justice fosters peace and reintegration of former insurgents into society (Elster 2004). More work is needed to understand public views on gender and insurgent violence, and the topic has become an important focus of emerging scholarship.

We consider the compelling case of female supporters of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Mosul Iraq. While a great deal of effort has been devoted to bringing ISIS leaders and fighters to justice in Iraq, less attention has been paid to the role of women in the movement as potential perpetrators and supporters of insurgent violence (Bond et al. 2019). Media reports tend to focus on female victimization, including abuse of women by ISIS, by Iraqi liberation forces, as well as by family, friends, and neighbors for their involvement in ISIS (Taub 2018; Human Rights Watch 2019), suggesting that ISIS women are highly stigmatized by Iraqi society. We seek to understand how ISIS women are judged in the court of public opinion. Our research has important implications for the reintegration of female insurgents in post-conflict societies and the effectiveness of transitional justice programs.

In a December 23-30, 2018 survey, we inquire about public perceptions of female accountability for supporting ISIS. We randomly sampled Mosul and inquired about their

punishment preferences for male and female ISIS supporters. We then replicated the survey in January 10-25 inside IDP camps known to house ISIS affiliated families outside Mosul. To explain punishment preferences, we evaluate theoretical arguments about insurgency-related identity cleavages, beliefs about proportionality of crime to punishment, and patriarchal gender norms. We also explore mechanisms driving punishment preferences in the form of blame attribution, threat perception of ISIS females relative to males, and victimization-based grievances.

In contrast to predictions of patriarchal gender norms, we find that Mosul civilians see ISIS women as potentially powerful agents, supporting ISIS of their own free will, and consider them radical, dangerous, critical to the functioning of ISIS organization, and instrumental in assisting ISIS fighters on the battlefield. While many Iraqis may in fact hold patriarchal views of women in society, they reject patriarchal explanations that women in ISIS were just showing obedience to their husbands and male leadership, handing down punishments proportional to women's perceived connection to ISIS leadership and combatants. In contrast, ISIS affiliated families in IDP camps espouse more patriarchal views about the role of women in the movement, tending to see women as merely following the dictates of their husbands and male leaders. Nevertheless, actual punishment preferences for ISIS men and women in the IDP camps are highly consistent. As predicted by pro/anti-insurgent identity cleavages, Mosul civilians seek greater retribution toward ISIS members compared to families with ISIS affiliations, who seek leniency in the form of amnesty and rehabilitation. Finally, in experimental survey vignettes, we find that residents of Mosul and ISIS affiliates in IDP camps mete out punishments to female ISIS members comparable to male counterparts. In terms of mechanisms, men and women tend to be punished more severely by those who place greater blame on them for ISIS violence and

perceive them as a future threat. While our findings run counter to predictions about patriarchal norms driving female accountability, they also point to concerns about the long-term stigmatization and abuse of ISIS women, potentially undermining the reintegration process.

Literature

Our research speaks to the intersection of literatures on transitional justice and women in rebellion and insurgencies. In the transitional justice literature, theorists often illustrate and critique the image of women as victims of male-driven wartime aggression and atrocities, potentially denying them agency as well as accountability in the process (Askin 1997; Teitel 2000; Elster 2004; Bell and O'Rourke 2007; Campbell 2007; Aguirre and Pietropaoli 2008; Buckley-Zistel and Zolkos 2012; Ní Aoláin, 2012; O'Rourke 2013, Jacoby 2015). This stands in contrast to the literature on female combatants, which tends to emphasize women as independent actors in their own right, capable of using violence in pursuit of political causes (Mazurana 2002; Nilsson and Thapar-Björkert 2013; Poloni-Staudinger and Ortbals 2014; Woodward and Duncanson 2017; Gentry et al. 2018; Marks 2017; King 2017; Nilsson 2018). While agent-victim dichotomies likely oversimplify the complexities of both female and male roles in violence, more work needs to be done to understand perceptions of women in conflict, especially with respect to justice and accountability.[1]

---

[1] A similar victim-perpetrator dichotomy can be found in the criminal justice literature (Messerschmidt 1993; Greenfeld and Snell 1999), and in the literature on children in conflict (Beber and Blattman 2013).

Our research contributes to the literature by considering whether publics perceive women as agents of insurgent violence and hold them accountable alongside men. We conduct our research in a timely and useful case involving women in the Islamic State in Iraq. While a number of scholars have engaged questions related to the rise of ISIS (Cockburn 2014; Weiss and Hassan 2016), ISIS recruitment strategies (Gambhir 2014; Farwell 2014; Klausen 2015), the role of women in ISIS (Peresin 2015; Peresin and Cervone 2015; Speckhard 2015), and ISIS accountability in general (Human Rights Watch 2017; Kao and Revkin 2018), questions about female accountability for insurgent violence is an underexplored topic, especially given the importance attributed to female agency in the literature on insurgency in Iraq and beyond (Bond et al. 2019; Buffan and Allison 2016; Chatterjee 2016). Specifically, we explore prevailing theories of justice and accountability based on conflict identity cleavages, proportionality, and patriarchal gender norms. We also consider underlying mechanisms driving punishment preferences toward men and women based on blame attribution, threat perceptions, and victimization-based grievances.

Theory and Hypotheses

How might publics hold men and women accountable for wartime violence and atrocities? We examine three plausible theoretical perspectives. The first is a social-psychological view commonly referred to as "victor's justice", which posits that when conflicts end in one-sided victories, punishments will be handed out according to the preferences of the winners at the expense of the losers, with an emphasis on retributive or punitive justice (Ho et al. 2002; Meernik 2003; Peskin 2005; Wringe 2006; Subotic 2009; Minear 2015). In general,

victor's justice follows the conventional logic of in-group winners punishing out-group losers. In-group favoritism and out-group prejudices have been well documented across a range of social and behavioral contexts (Tajfel et al. 1971; Hewstone et al. 2002; Balliet et al. 2014) and conflict has been shown to intensify parochial social and political opposition to out-groups (Bauer et al. 2016; Hadzic et al. 2017; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017; Rozenas et al. 2017; Mironova and Whitt 2018). We anticipate that people who oppose insurgency will punish suspected insurgents more severely, regardless of gender, than pro-insurgency supporters. As such, punishment preferences may function as a litmus test for one's underlying preferences toward insurgency. We test the following hypothesis:

H1 (Identity Cleavages) ISIS members will receive harsher punishments from insurgency opponents than insurgency supporters.

Second, we consider criminological and jurisprudence perspectives on punishment based on proportionality and various understandings of justice. At one end, amnesty-based solutions tend to emphasize restorative justice through truth and reconciliation (Wilson 2001; Braithwaite 2002; Gibson 2004; Van Ness and Strong 2014; Cobban 2015). A middle ground often involves a rehabilitation approach to justice favoring short-term punishments where the goal is to bring offenders eventually back into society (Raynor and Robinson 2005; Robinson and Crow 2009).[2] In contrast, long-term imprisonments and life sentences often emphasize punitive or retributive justice (Von Hirsch 1976; Hogan and Emler 1981; Darley and Pittman 2003; Carlsmith and

---

[2] We do not consider processes of compensatory justice here, which we will leave for a future study. See Darley and Pittman 2003

Darley 2008). Such punishments may also serve as a form of deterrence where incarceration or incapacitation is intended to prevent future crimes as well as for retributive/punitive purposes (Darley et al. 2000). Finally, the death penalty signifies one the harshest forms of retributive justice in Iraq and worldwide, even though it is generally regarded as ineffective if not counterproductive at preventing violent crime (Zimring 2004; Hood and Hoyle 2015).

We anticipate that punishment preferences toward ISIS supporters could be a function of the crimes they are alleged to have committed, reflecting broader norms of proportionality, and may also signal whether publics consider insurgents to be capable of re-entering into society (favoring rehabilitation) or not (favoring incapacitation through life-long incarceration or death). As such, we inquire whether publics will draw distinctions between "true believers" and "opportunists" in their punishment preferences, reserving harsher punishments for dedicated loyalists (Weinstein 2006; Oppenheim et al. 2015). We predict that ISIS members who have closer connections to organizational leadership and combatant roles in a rebel organization will be viewed as less redeemable and therefore punished more severely than those in lesser leadership and violence-drive functions in the organization. We test the following hypothesis:

H2 (Proportionality) ISIS members will be punished in proportion to their perceived role in a conflict with harsher punishments reserved for those with greater leadership status and combat functions.

Next, we consider the influence of patriarchal norms where women are treated differently from men on the basis of gendered assumptions about the roles women assume during wartime: the most common of which being that women are merely victims of male perpetrators/instigators

7

of violence (Bell and O'Rourke 2007; Campbell 2007; Aguirre and Pietropaoli 2008; Buckley-Zistel and Zolkos 2012; Ní Aoláin, 2012; O'Rourke 2013). Recent scholarship, however, argues that a victim-oriented perception of women in conflict overshadows the agency that women have in facilitating violence in various combat and combat support roles (Parkinson 2013; Thomas and Bond 2015; Loken and Zelenz 2018). We inquire whether publics internalize patriarchal notions of violence or see women as agents in their own right. If women are primarily seen as victims and men as perpetrators/instigators of violence, then this could lead to lesser punishments for women compared to men.[3] We test the following hypothesis:

H3 (Patriarchal Norms) ISIS females will receive less severe punishments than ISIS males.

Finally, we explore a number of plausible mechanisms driving punishment preferences for men versus women in the context of insurgent violence. For example, if there is a gender gap in punishment preferences between male and female insurgents, how do we know if that gap is actually a function of patriarchal norms or beliefs about male versus female culpability for violence, or something else? First, we consider the relationship between blame attribution and accountability, where we argue that people's drive for retribution may increase when they feel that institutions of adjudication have failed to deliver on public expectations for justice (Kerr and Mobekk 2007; Leebaw 2008; Lambourne 2009; Rodman 2009). We anticipate that the public may punish men and women more if they feel they have not been held sufficiently accountable.

_____

[3] Gender neutrality in punishment preferences is the null hypothesis. A counter-hypothesis, driven potentially by misogyny, might argue that ISIS women could receive harsher punishment than males in comparable roles.

Patriarchal norms would predict that subjects will blame ISIS males more than females and seek to hold them to greater accountability for violence. Second, we examine a threat perception mechanism based on fear of out-groups. Consistent with research on integrated threat theory (Stephan and Stephan 2013), we argue that individuals are more likely to mete out harsh punishment (incapacitation rather than amnesty or rehabilitation) due to the uncertainty of future threats posed by ex-combatants and their affiliates. Threat perception may also reflect patriarchal gender norms if publics are more fearful of future threats posed by ISIS males over ISIS females. Third, we evaluate a grievance mechanism, where people who have been personally victimized by combatants would favor harsher retributive punishments over amnesty and rehabilitation (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).[4] If ISIS women are perceived primarily as victims or bystanders rather than perpetrators of violence, then victims may be more punitive toward ISIS males than females in exacting punishments. While these mechanisms are not exhaustive, they provide further insights into the role gender might play in public perceptions of accountability for insurgent violence. We now turn to the specifics of the case of ISIS in Iraq.

Rationale for Case Selection

Iraq is a compelling case to address the role of gender and patriarchal norms in shaping public perceptions of insurgency and transitional justice. Iraqi law has a long history of patriarchal treatment of women from the pre-Baathist/Baathist to the post-2003 period, which could reinforce patriarchal perceptions about male vs. female accountability for ISIS violence

---

[4] We cannot evaluate comparable "greed" mechanisms due to the absence of clear compensatory justice instruments in the Iraqi case.

(Constitution of Iraq 2005; Efrati 2005; Al-Ali 2005; 2007; Al-Moumin 2007; Al-Ali and Pratt 2010). If Iraqi society is a reflection of the law, one would expect Iraqi publics to hold different standards of justice and accountability for men and women. However, ISIS women offer an interesting challenge not only to Iraqi law but also to assumptions about conventional public norms regarding female agency.

Following the liberation of Mosul by Iraqi Armed Forces in 2017, thousands of people and their families were detained on suspicion of having supported the Islamic State, which ruled over Mosul between 2014-2017. Many were put on trial in a process marred by widespread and systematic human rights abuses (Belkis 2017; Human Rights Watch 2017; 2019). Frequently, suspected ISIS members were subject to extrajudicial killings, torture, and court trials without any pretense to due process (see Taub 2018 for a narrative illustration). However, even if Iraq courts were to adhere to the letter of the law, Iraqi law itself is often ambiguous about what to do with women who supported ISIS, married ISIS fighters, and worked in administrative positions under ISIS. Consequently, women have been handed down highly inconsistent punishments for their perceived involvement in the organization (Chatterjee 2016; Davis 2016; Belkis 2017; Jones and Asquith 2018

For example, the vast majority of detainees brought to justice for ISIS-related violence are male, despite evidence that women participated in some combat roles.[5] In some cases, female nurses who worked for ISIS in the ministry of health or female accountants who worked

---

[5] Despite ISIS propaganda to the contrary, women did participate in combat. For example, in a rare case, a German female ISIS member was convicted by an Iraqi court for her combatant role as a suspected sniper. See Bond et al. 2019.

in the ministry of finance have been sentenced to long-term imprisonment by Iraqi courts. Punishments have been also handed down to women in indirect support roles, such as offering safe houses for ISIS operations or preparing meals for ISIS fighters.[6] Judges have also struggled with respect to whether and how to punish "ISIS brides", and punishments have been inconsistent because the law is unclear (Taub 2018; Jones and Asquith 2018). Recent field interviews by one of the authors suggest that judges typically reserve punishment for wives of higher level ISIS leadership, while sparing punishment for wives of lower-level combatants. However, a comprehensive dataset involving ISIS trials and their outcomes is not yet available to assess the extent of gender inequality in punishment outcomes.

Given uncertain and discretionary sentencing options toward women in ISIS, we seek to understand how Iraqi civilians feel about female accountability. Specifically, we look to those who were most directly affected by ISIS rule: civilians in Mosul on both supporting and opposing sides of the insurgency, and who still co-exist in a post-ISIS Iraq.[7] As such, our research provides an important metric of how the public views the transitional justice process with respect to women of ISIS, with implications for whether they may be allowed re-enter Iraqi society or shunned and stigmatized.

Research Design

---

[6] Based on observations of women at ISIS trials by one of the authors as well as interviews with ISIS trial judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.

[7] We lacked the resources to conduct a nationwide survey of Iraq, so we concentrated on Mosul as a critical case for transitional justice where insurgency supporters and opponents cohabitate.

To evaluate public perceptions of male and female accountability, we examine punishment preferences against alleged ISIS supporters and affiliates.[8] We measure punishment preferences using a range of survey instruments, focusing on punishing people affiliated with ISIS in an array of combatant, noncombatant and leadership roles, and whether those preferences vary in accordance with identity cleavages, beliefs about proportionality between crime and punishment, and patriarchal norms about gender and violence.

To assess insurgency related identity cleavages (H1), we conduct case-control comparisons of punishment preferences of current residents of Mosul, who we believe to be largely opposed to ISIS, to those in IDP camps outside Mosul, who we suspect to have generally supported the insurgency. To test proportionality (H2), we ask respondents what punishment they think would be appropriate for individuals with different levels of ISIS involvement ranging from top leadership, fighters, civilian workers and administrators, religious police to ordinary taxpayers. Here, our instruments are analogous to Kao and Revkin (2018) but with greater emphasis on gender treatments. Punishment options reflect different norms of justice ranging from amnesty (restorative justice), short term prison sentences (rehabilitative justice), long-term and life prison sentences (incapacitation) to the death penalty (retributive justice), though they may also be ordered in terms of severity. To probe for patriarchal norms about gender and accountability (H3), we compare punishment preferences from survey experimental vignettes that randomly vary the gender and role of the perpetrator in ISIS. H3 would predict that punishment preferences will be less severe when the framing involves explicit reference to women over men in the same functional role.

---

[8] This research design received IRB approval. See the online appendix for a discussion of ethical conduct of research.

To test H3, we employ five survey vignette experiments with randomized treatments to identify gender-specific punishment preferences. The male vignettes focus on men as either ideological or opportunistic workers vs. fighters for ISIS, which is consistent with the conventional dichotomy of rebel group motivations identified in the literature (Weinstein 2006; Oppenheim et al. 2018). The first vignette features a male who has worked for ISIS in Mosul. In the vignette, subjects receive information about whether the male is a loyal follower of ISIS or someone who worked for ISIS primarily to support his family. Subjects are asked to indicate an appropriate punishment ranging from amnesty to the death penalty. The second vignette features a male who is randomly assigned to treatments as either a loyal fighter for ISIS or someone who fought primarily to support his family. We inquire from the vignettes whether subjects are more punitive of ideological "true believers" or entrepreneurial "opportunists".

We then turned to vignettes focusing on punishment of female supporters of ISIS. We chose different vignettes for women and men consistent with their roles in ISIS, which were often segregated, especially with respect to combat and leadership roles (Cook 2005; Lahoud 2014; Chatterjee 2016). We focus on the role of women in ISIS as wives vs. workers, and wives of high level commanders vs. low level fighters.

In the first female vignette, we ask respondents to judge the case of a women, who is randomly assigned to be either a wife of an ISIS fighter (a proxy for association with ISIS-related violence), or someone who has worked for ISIS (a proxy for involvement in ISIS governance). We also underscore that the wife willfully married the ISIS fighter in the first treatment to rule out the concern of forced marriage. In the second vignette, we introduce a woman who is randomly assigned to be either the wife of a low-level ISIS fighter or a high-level ISIS commander (a proxy for connection to ISIS leadership vs. rank-and-file members).

13

Finally, although ISIS typically enforced strict segregation between men from women in the workplace and placed restrictions on female fighters (Chatterjee 2016), we include a final vignette where subjects are asked how to punish someone who worked for ISIS which we randomize by gender.

In all five vignettes, the punishment options are the same, ranging from amnesty to the death penalty. This allows us to compare across male and female treatments among the vignettes to identify whether subjects punish males more heavily than females in various ISIS-affiliated roles. In our analysis, we will also compare the average severity of punishment across male and female treatments in the vignettes to control group measures of ISIS punishment preferences (without reference to gender).

Finally, to assess mechanisms underlying patriarchal norms and punishment preferences, we focus on three factors: blame attribution (Do people think women are being sufficiently punished for their role in ISIS compared to men?), threat perception (Do people think ISIS women pose as great a future threat as ISIS men?) and victimization-based grievance motives (Do victims punish men to a greater extent than women for their perceived role in violence?). We now turn to details of our sampling method and data collection.

Sampling and Data Collection

We conduct a survey of Mosul civilians and compare their attitudes and behavior to IDPs in ISIS affiliated camps using a case-control sampling design. Due to unknown population parameters resulting from massive population transfers before and after ISIS occupation, it is impossible to draw population inferences from our samples. However, we can introduce a

14

random selection procedure to sample among those who are currently residing in Mosul and those who reside in the ISIS affiliated camps for purposes of comparison. While this is less than ideal, ours is a common problem posed by conflict and post-conflict environments due to the absence of accurate census data and highly fluid, migratory populations. Nevertheless, our samples should provide an indicator of the variation in punishment preferences among different pro/anti-insurgency cohorts.

Sampling in Mosul was conducted via random selection of neighborhoods and random route technique at the neighborhood level. In total 401 subjects were sampled across 11 neighborhoods in Mosul (See Appendix Map for Mosul sampling locations). Among the IDPs, we purposefully sampled camps outside Mosul that were known to house people who had supported ISIS (3 out of 15 camps in Nineveh province). Many families with suspected ties to ISIS were rounded up and/or fled Mosul during and after the liberation and many remain inside IDP camps for fear of retribution should they return to Mosul and/or because their houses were destroyed (Belkis 2018). We sampled 195 respondents from three main camps south of Mosul with the permission of local camp authorities. Each camp was set up on a grid, which enabled random selection of primary sampling locations within each camp (See SI Appendix Maps for camp sampling locations). In each case, we used the same team of local enumerators trained by a reputable field administrator, who was trained and supervised by one of the authors in Mosul. Fieldwork in Mosul was conducted between December 23-30, 2018 and fieldwork in the camps was completed between January 10-25, 2019. We estimate the survey response rate at approximately 42% for Mosul and 28% in the camps, which we attribute to the sensitivity of our topic and the fact that we were not compensating people to participate in the study.

In Table 1, we provide Kolmogorov-Smirnov balance tests which indicate that the samples are distinct with respect to distributions around age, education, income, and most recent employment activities. Additional demographic information about our sample is provided in Appendix Table 1. Mosul civilians are more educated, have higher incomes, and tend to come from more professional backgrounds of employment or are currently students. Camp members are conversely of lower education, income, and tend to have more manual labor backgrounds, which anecdotally fits into the public perception in Mosul of the typical ISIS demographic. There is better balance on gender, unemployment, and time spent in Mosul. The majority of subjects lived in Mosul throughout the ISIS occupation. We will adjust for imbalances in the sample when conducting subsequent analysis through extended controls and matching to rule out differences in sample characteristics driving results.

Table 1 provides a basic overview of demographics from within Mosul and the ISIS camps.

Table 1. Demographic Summary

	Mosul Civilians			ISIS Camps			
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	Balance
female	401	0.24	0.43	195	0.17	0.38	0.06
age	401	34.40	13.21	195	35.35	11.76	0.15***
education	400	2.92	0.78	195	1.96	0.82	0.40***
income	401	2.56	0.76	195	1.26	0.57	0.73***
moved	401	0.20	0.40	195	0.14	0.35	0.05
professional	401	0.34	0.47	195	0.09	0.28	0.25***
laborer	401	0.20	0.40	195	0.59	0.49	0.39***
student	401	0.29	0.46	195	0.13	0.34	0.16***
unemployed	401	0.16	0.37	195	0.18	0.39	0.02

Finally, our sampling strategy presumes that most people in the Mosul sample will be opposed to ISIS while most in the camp sample will have been former ISIS supporters and

affiliates. To validate our claim that the camps we visited were designed to house families with ISIS affiliations, most of whom fled Mosul or were rounded up by authorities during or after the 2017 liberation (Belkis 2018), we rely on self-reported information about ISIS affiliation. We employed an enumerator who had ties to some people in the camps and would likely be able to gain their trust, though we anticipate that ISIS affiliations are nevertheless underreported due to fears of reprisal. Despite these limitations, Table 2 indicates that 1 in 5 camp members acknowledged that they worked directly for ISIS or fought for ISIS. Over half indicate that a family member worked for ISIS, while 1 in 5 also have a family member that fought for ISIS, and nearly two-thirds have family members who have been put on trial for their role in ISIS. In total, 91% of camp IDPs indicated some form of ISIS connection or affiliation.

Table 2. Self-Reported ISIS Affiliation in Camps

ISIS Affiliation	N	Mean	SD
Worked for ISIS	195	0.21	0.41
Spouse worked for ISIS	195	0.04	0.19
Family member worked for ISIS	195	0.55	0.50
Fought for ISIS	195	0.17	0.38
Spouse fought for ISIS	195	0.11	0.32
Family member fought for ISIS	195	0.20	0.40
Family member on trial for role in ISIS	195	0.64	0.48
Had any affiliation with ISIS	195	0.92	0.28

Due to concerns about self-censorship for fear of reprisal, we did not ask respondents to indicate their current or past support for ISIS. Instead, we probed for ISIS support indirectly by

asking "how many people in Mosul do you think supported ISIS during the occupation?".[9] Based on psychological projection, we reason that those who supported ISIS would estimate ISIS support in Mosul to be greater than to those who opposed ISIS. Consistent with our sampling strategy, we find that nearly two-thirds of camp members believe that "almost all" or "most people in Mosul supported ISIS" (63%), while very few civilians we sampled in Mosul (15%) say they think this was the case. Hence, we argue that we are capturing two distinct groups that lived among one another inside Mosul: those who supported and worked for ISIS and those who generally did not. Ultimately, we anticipate that affinity for ISIS will also be revealed by punishment preferences, but our samples should provide a sufficient comparison point for testing the identity cleavage hypothesis (H1) involving ISIS support and opposition.

Results

We begin by examining punishment preferences for ISIS members without explicit reference to gender, some of which we will later use as a control when comparing gender effects. Figure 1 indicates the mean punishments for a range of ISIS affiliation categories. Punishment options range from 1 = amnesty, 2 = short-term detention, 3 = long-term detention, 4 = life in prison, or 5 = death, which are consistent with decisions used by Iraqi courts to punish ISIS detainees (HRW 2017, Kao and Revkin 2018). First, as predicted by H1, ordinary Mosul civilians are more punitive toward ISIS members in general than people in IDP camps. This

---

[9] We were unable to include more sophisticated list or endorsement experiments to evaluate ISIS support due to our small sample size (Blair et al. 2014). We expect that support for ISIS is generally under-reported but support for ISIS may also be revealed in punishment preferences.

suggests an in-group/out-group effect, where insurgency opponents have stronger punishment preferences than insurgency supporters. Also, consistent with H2, subjects are more severe in punishing ISIS leadership, combatants, intelligence and religious police (*Emni, Hizbeh*)[10] than those in non-combatant roles. This signals that the public are willing to apply norms of proportionality in punishment preferences. They are selective in terms of who and how much to punish.

Figure 1. ISIS Punishment Preferences (gender non-specific)

Next, to examine H3, we turn to our first four survey vignettes with gender specific frames. The first two vignettes involve male frames. Vignette 1 reports results where subjects decide whether to punish either 1 = a male loyalist who volunteered to fight for ISIS or 2 = an opportunistic male who only fought for ISIS to support his family. Vignette 2 involves the same two treatments, except in this case, the male worked for, rather than fought for ISIS. The next two vignettes involve female frames. In Vignette 3, subjects must decide whether to punish

---

[10] See Speckhard and Yayla (2017) for detailed discussion of ISIS religious police.

either 1 = the wife of an ISIS fighter or 2 = a woman who worked for ISIS. In Vignette 4, subjects decide how to punish either 1 = the wife of a low-level ISIS fighter or 2 = the wife of a high-level ISIS commander. In all cases, the dependent variable ranges from 1 = amnesty to 5 =death penalty.

Figure 2 indicates responses to each treatment item in the four vignettes (eight treatment groups total). As before, there appears to be in-group/out-group bias with respect to punishment of ISIS. Consistent with identity cleavages (H1), Mosul civilians are more punitive than ISIS camp members across all treatment conditions. Second, subjects tend to be more punitive of ISIS combatants than non-combatants, suggesting proportionality with respect to participation in violence (H2), especially for Mosul civilians. IDP camp members are less selective in punishing different groups and less punitive overall. Finally, in opposition to patriarchal norms about accountability (H3), neither camp members nor Mosul civilians appear to be especially lenient toward ISIS females compared to ISIS males. Mosul civilians are willing to punish female ISIS affiliates as severely as males (the mean response being long-term detention). People in ISIS affiliated camps are less punitive of women than Mosul civilians, but their punishment of women is still at parity with punishment of men (the mean response being between amnesty and short-term detention).

Figure 2. Punishment Preferences by Perpetrator Gender

As none of these four vignettes directly manipulated gender in the treatment, we conducted an additional fifth vignette in a follow-up May 2019 survey of Mosul civilians only (N =357).[11] In Vignette 5, subjects must decide how to punish someone who is accused of working for ISIS, randomized by gender. We find that gender effects on punishments of ISIS workers are not significant in the Mosul sample (t = 1.08, p<0.14). Consistent with Figure 2, the average punishment was long-term imprisonment in both the male treatment (mean = 2.91, SD = 0.56) and in the female treatment (mean = 2.83, SD =0.71). These additional results reinforce the lack of gender effects in our main study, and fail to support H3.

So far, we have found support for identity based and proportionality based explanations for how publics think about justice and insurgent accountability, but we fail to find strong gender

_____

[11] The May 2019 survey focused on other topics, and we are limited in our analysis beyond this additional vignette. See the online appendix for further details.

effects. To better understand these results, we probe for mechanisms to explain why some punish ISIS more than others and that might capture underlying attitudes toward gender and insurgent violence. To do this, we focus on blame attribution, threat perceptions of ISIS, and grievance-based motivations.

To measure perceptions of blame attribution, we ask respondents whether they agree or disagree that different groups are being sufficiently punished for their role in ISIS on a four-point scale. If patriarchal norms are prevalent, we would anticipate lower blame attribution for ISIS females. We ask subjects to respond to items across different functional categories of ISIS membership ranging from ISIS leadership, fighters, foreign fighters, civilian followers, as well as women who married ISIS leaders and fighters, and women who worked for ISIS (See SI Figure 3 and SI Questionnaire). As responses to these items were highly inter-correlated, we use factor analysis to create an index called *blameattribution* which scores all seven items from strongly agree to strongly disagree that ISIS affiliates are being sufficiently punished (SI Table 1). We also created a separate *blamewomen* index which only scores the items on ISIS wives and female workers. Higher scores on the indices should correspond to greater desire for punishment of men and women in ISIS.

To measure threat perception, we utilize a series of questions related to the future threat posed by ISIS men and women to Iraqi security. We ask respondents whether they agree or disagree with a series of six statements regarding the threat women in ISIS pose relative to men (See SI Figure 4 and SI Questionnaire). Statements include the following: "women in ISIS were just as radical as men", "…could be just as dangerous as men in the future"; "...played an important role in ISIS organization"; "…in supporting ISIS fighters" and two contradictory statements that women "who worked for ISIS should not be punished because the men were in

charge" and "ISIS wives should not be punished because they were only following their husbands". Factor analysis indicated that responses to these items are highly inter-correlated (SI Table 2). We score these items into a common index called *threatperception* ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree on whether women are as dangerous as men. Higher scores on the index indicate greater threat perception of ISIS females relative to males.

Finally, to measure victimization-based punitive motives, we ask all respondents to recount abuses they or family members incurred during ISIS occupation.[12] Abuses range from being punished for violating ISIS rules and laws, personal injury, injury or death at the hands of an ISIS member, being threatened or imprisoned by ISIS, having one's home occupied or looted by ISIS, or whether female family members were abused or assaulted by ISIS. Factor analysis indicates that victimization items also score well together such that the experiences of victimization are highly inter-correlated (See SI Figure 5, Table 3). We combined all items into a single index called *victimization* to measure grievance-based incentives for punishing ISIS members. We did not ask about the gender of the perpetrator of violence, though we anticipate that if victims identify ISIS males as primary perpetrators of violence, then victims would be more willing to punish ISIS men over ISIS women. Higher scores on the index indicate increasing number of victimization events experienced under ISIS rule.

Table 3. Punishment of ISIS (OLS regression)

VARIABLES	(1) Identity	(2) Proportion-	(3) Patriarchal

---

[12] This was done at the end of the survey to avoid explicit priming on victimization.

	cleavages	ality	norms
Mosul civilians	1.396***	1.390***	0.933***
	(0.0782)	(0.0776)	(0.124)
proportionality		0.380***	
		(0.00739)	
Loyal male worker			-0.0553
			(0.0811)
Opportunist male worker			-0.0254
			(0.0687)
Female fighter wife			0.00795
			(0.0780)
Female worker			0.456***
			(0.0650)
Female wife low-level			-0.0530
			(0.0800)
Female wife high-level			0.343***
			(0.0713)
blameattribution	0.0524*	0.0537*	0.153***
	(0.0285)	(0.0283)	(0.0455)
threatperception	0.116***	0.115***	0.229***
	(0.0357)	(0.0354)	(0.0588)
victimization	0.0206	0.0207	0.0751
	(0.0316)	(0.0313)	(0.0526)
female	-0.0569	-0.0584	-0.224***
	(0.0624)	(0.0617)	(0.0860)
age	-0.00118	-0.00127	-0.000725
	(0.00259)	(0.00256)	(0.00398)
education	-0.0865**	-0.0866**	-0.0777
	(0.0365)	(0.0362)	(0.0548)
income	0.0795**	0.0796**	0.134**
	(0.0364)	(0.0360)	(0.0541)
professional	0.157*	0.159*	0.140
	(0.0878)	(0.0870)	(0.131)
laborer	0.0223	0.0268	-0.151
	(0.0845)	(0.0838)	(0.123)
unemployed	0.0690	0.0701	0.0257
	(0.0779)	(0.0772)	(0.125)
moved	0.139**	0.139**	0.114
	(0.0627)	(0.0621)	(0.0899)
Constant	2.207***	0.316**	1.925***
	(0.132)	(0.135)	(0.200)
Observations	544	4,881	2,167
adj. r2	0.625	0.575	0.302

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3 above reports results from OLS regression on punishment choices for individuals with varying ISIS affiliations. Each model focuses on evaluating hypotheses regarding identity cleavages (Model 1), proportionality (Model 2) and patriarchal gender norms (Model 3). Each model also controls for demographic variation in the sample as well as mechanistic controls for blame attribution, threat perception, and victimization.

In Model 1, the dependent variable (*alphapunishisis*) is an index of punishment choices for ISIS affiliates using the combined baseline instruments from Figure 1. These items score well indicating that people tend to consistently favor strong or limited punishments for people with different levels of ISIS affiliation (Cronbach alpha = 0.93, SI Table 4). Model 1 indicates that Mosul civilians are significantly more punitive of ISIS than those in the camps, as predicted by the identity cleavage hypothesis (H1).

In Model 2, the dependent variable (*punishmentrange*) disaggregates all the punishment preferences for each subject in Model 1. As there were nine different functional roles related to supporting ISIS ranging from top leadership to merely taxpayers, this increases the overall N from 544 to 4,881 observations (nine punishment preferences for each subject). Regressions are estimated controlling for these individual fixed effects. The key independent variable in this model is *proportionality*, which treats each category of ISIS affiliation as increasing in importance to the organization, ranging from 1 = someone who payed taxes to ISIS to 9 = ISIS leadership. Consistent with our hypothesis about proportionality (H2), Model 2 indicates that punishment preferences become more severe as the target increases in relative importance within the movement in relationship to leadership and involvement in violence.

Finally, Model 3 examines the impact of patriarchal norms about accountability by comparing punishment preferences across different vignettes. We exclude the male fighter Vignette 1, as we do not have comparable treatments for female fighters, which were less common in ISIS than female workers.[13] Model 3 then utilizes a dependent variable (*punishgender*) which combines male and female vignette punishment preferences for each treatment group and compares them to a non-gender specific point of reference: the punishment of ISIS civilian supporters from Figure 1. As each individual completed three different vignette treatments plus the non-gender specific reference group, the total N increases by roughly four from 544 to 2,167. The model controls for these individual fixed effects.

If patriarchal norms about accountability are driving punishment preferences, then we would expect Model 3 to show males being punished more severely than females in various non-combatant roles or compared to our non-gender specific reference point, which is represented by the constant term in the regression. However, male workers are punished comparably to our reference point of civilian ISIS supporters as well as to ISIS wives in general and wives of low-level ISIS combatants. Furthermore, subjects do not clearly discern between male "true believers" vs. "opportunists" when it comes to working for ISIS (Oppenheim et al. 2017). They punish them consistently. [14] Among the female treatments, respondents tended to punish women more if they worked for ISIS or if they were married to an ISIS commander compared to the civilian reference group.[15] Hence, Model 3 indicates that women are perceived as having

---

[13] In Vignette 1, punishments far exceeded those of non-combatant ISIS members as predicted by our proportionality hypothesis (See SI Table 5).

[14] The same is true for punishment of ISIS male combatants. See SI Table 5.
[15] See SI Table 5 for simple binary treatment comparisons for each vignette.

accountability in the movement at parity with men who worked for ISIS, and are not willing to absolve wives of ISIS combatants and leaders of punishment. These preferences do not support H3 regarding patriarchal norms of accountability.

To further understand what is driving punishment preferences, we turn to mechanistic variables related to beliefs about blame attribution, threat perception of ISIS followers, and victimization-based grievances. We find that both blame attribution and threat perception are predictive of more severe punishments. Results are consistent when we measure blame attribution only for ISIS females, excluding other reference categories. In contrast, victimization by ISIS does not predict more severe punishments. In Figure 3 below, we note that all three instruments (blame attribution, threat perception, and victimization) are greater among Mosul civilians than those who live in the camps, which offers a plausible mechanistic explanation for why Mosul civilians are more punitive toward ISIS beyond victor's justice (See SI Figure 6 for structural equation models). Mosul civilians are more likely to blame both males and females for ISIS violence and feel threatened by both male and female ISIS members in the future compared to those in IDP camps.[16] The lack of correlation between victimization and more severe punishment preferences is surprising, but we do not have sufficient information to understand how subjects might direct victimization-related grievances toward male versus female perpetrators of violence. Public attitudes toward female perpetrators of violence should be unpacked in future research.

---

[16] Comparing across categories of blame attribution, Mosul civilians on average indicate that females are not being sufficiently punished compared to other categories of leaders, fighters, and non-gender specific civilian supporters (paired t-test = 2.01, p<0.022) while those in IDP camps tend to attribute greater blame to ISIS males over females (paired t-test = 2.45, p<0.008).

Figure 3. Plausible Mediators of ISIS Punishment

Finally, extended demographic controls indicate that female subjects are less punitive toward ISIS than male subjects in the survey vignettes. However, in SI Table 5, we show that this effect is driven primarily by lower punishments for male ISIS members in Vignettes 1 and 2. Female subjects punish female ISIS members in Vignettes 3 and 4 consistent with male subjects. Also, education, income, and having a professional employment background is correlated with increasing severity of punishment for ISIS. As we noted in our demographic Table 1, people from ISIS affiliated families tended to be of lower income and less education than Mosul civilian counter-parts. Income and educational effects on harsher punishment could be reflecting class differences between Mosul civilians and their ISIS affiliated counterparts. Also, subjects who were displaced from Mosul during ISIS rule are more punitive, which could represent another indirect proxy for victimization-related grievances. However, if victimization were driving punishment preferences, we should observe stronger affects in our direct victimization measure,

but we do not. We also find that the differences in punishment preferences between Mosul and ISIS civilians are robust to inverse probability regression weighting and propensity score matching to adjust for demographic imbalances across the two samples (SI Tables 6-8).

Overall, we observe strong support in our analysis for identity cleavages (H1) and beliefs about proportionality between crime and punishment (H2) in punishment preferences. We do not find support for patriarchal norms driving punishment preferences toward ISIS (H3): publics do not assign more severe punishments to ISIS men compared to ISIS women. To explain punishment preferences, we show that blame attribution and threat perceptions of ISIS men and women are more important than victimization-related grievances.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our research indicates that public perceptions of justice and accountability toward women in ISIS are not clearly driven by patriarchal gender norms in Iraq. Civilians in Mosul are able to see women as independent actors in their own right, regard women in ISIS as a future threat, and feel that they are not being held sufficiently accountable for ISIS violence. As such, our findings speak to an emerging literature on women as autonomous agents of insurgent violence. While Mosul civilians are wary of ISIS, as reflected in their austere punishment preferences against ISIS functionaries, they are also capable of applying punishments proportionately, holding leaders and combatants to a higher standard of accountability than non-combatant civilian followers and supporters. At the same time, they seek accountability for women who voluntarily married into the organization or worked for ISIS in some volitional capacity.

We also observe disparities in how Mosul civilians and ISIS affiliated families think about accountability. Mosul civilians are much more favorable to retributive justice, willing to hand down long-term prison sentences or death in many cases to ISIS supporters. Those in the camps, however, prefer a more restorative and rehabilitative approach, involving amnesty and short-term incarceration for non-violent ISIS members, both male and female. However, Iraqi law is currently siding with Mosul civilians, and judges routinely dispense harsh sentences to suspected ISIS members in trials that, in many cases, lack any pretense to due process (Human Rights Watch 2017).

This austere approach to accountability, however, will likely have long-term detrimental effects on peace and stability, and should serve as a valuable lesson for transitional justice processes elsewhere. Victor's justice, while potentially politically popular, will likely lead to the re-mobilization of defeated insurgents, as is already happening in Iraq. Furthermore, public perceptions of ISIS women as dangerous agents of violence may also lead to long-term stigmatization, and retributive punishments will likely push them back into insurgency alongside their male counterparts, as well as their children. A better approach, we would argue, would involve some realistic peace-justice trade-offs, that while holding ISIS men and women accountable, would also offer some incentives for de-mobilization and re-integration into society. Otherwise, Iraq's transitional justice program is a blueprint for prolonging conflict traps, and a model not to emulate, but avoid.

Finally, our research is not an exhaustive treatment of issues related to women in conflict or transitional justice. More research should explore patriarchal norms driving attitudes toward women in violence and potential mechanisms including greater emphasis on social customs and

attributes toward women in society more broadly than we have covered here.[17] More studies should also be conducted in cases where the lines between male and female venues for participation in violence are more blurred than was the case with ISIS in Iraq. Despite, however, the ostensible prohibitions in ISIS ideology against integrating men and women into combat and combat support roles, and some de facto evidence to the contrary, we find that Iraqi publics see women in ISIS in many ways as sharing culpability with male counterparts. They are also willing to hold them accountable, justly or unjustly, alongside men, which makes Iraq a compelling case for understanding public perceptions of female agency and responsibility for political violence.

References

---

[17] For example, we consider threat perception but misogyny is another potential driver of punishment preferences that should be explored in future research.

Aguirre, Daniel, and Irene Pietropaoli. 2008. "Gender equality, development and transitional justice: The case of Nepal." *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 2(3): 356-377.

Al-Ali, Nadje. 2005. "Reconstructing Gender: Iraqi women between dictatorship, war, sanctions and occupation." *Third World Quarterly* 26(4-5): 739-758.

Al-Ali, Nadje Sadig. 2007. *Iraqi women: Untold stories from 1948 to the present*. Zed Books.

Al-Ali, Nadje, and Nicola Pratt. 2010. *What kind of liberation?: Women and the occupation of Iraq*. Univ of California Press.

Al-Moumin, Mishkat. 2007. Constitutional and Legal Rights of Iraqi Women. Middle East Institute: https://www.mei.edu/publications/constitutional-and-legal-rights-iraqi-women

Askin, Kelly Dawn. 1997. *War crimes against women: Prosecution in international war crimes tribunals*. Vol. 1. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Balliet, Daniel, Junhui Wu, and Carsten KW De Dreu. 2014. "Ingroup favoritism in cooperation: a meta-analysis." *Psychological bulletin* 140(6): 1556.

Beber, Bernd, and Christopher Blattman. 2013. "The logic of child soldiering and coercion." *International Organization* 67(1): 65-104.

Bell, Christine, and Catherine O'Rourke. 2007. "Does feminism need a theory of transitional justice? An introductory essay." *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1(1): 23-44.

Belkis, Wille 2017. Iraq: Why ISIS Trials are Robbing Women of their Rights. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/05/iraq-why-isis-trials-are-robbing-victims-their-rights.

Belkis, Wille 2018. Iraq's So-Called "ISIS Families": Rounded up, Vilified, Forgotten. Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/11/14/iraqs-so-called-isis-families-rounded-vilified-forgotten

Blair, Graeme, Kosuke Imai, and Jason Lyall. 2014. "Comparing and combining list and endorsement experiments: Evidence from Afghanistan." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4): 1043-1063.

Bond, Kanisha, Kate Cronin-Furman, Meredith Loken, Milli Lake, Sarah Parkinson, Anna Zelenz (2019). "The West Needs to Take the Politics of Women in ISIS Seriously." *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/04/the-west-needs-to-take-the-politics-of-women-in-isis-seriously/

Braithwaite, John. 2002. *Restorative justice & responsive regulation*. Oxford University Press.

Buckley-Zistel, Susanne, and Magdalena Zolkos. 2012. "Introduction: Gender in transitional justice." In *Gender in transitional justice*, pp. 1-33. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Buffon, Veronica, and Christine Allison. 2016. "The gendering of victimhood: Western media and the Sinjar genocide." *Kurdish Studies* 4(2): 176-196.

Campbell, Kirsten. 2007. "The gender of transitional justice: Law, sexual violence and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1(3): 411-432.

Carlsmith, Kevin M., and John M. Darley. 2008. "Psychological aspects of retributive justice." *Advances in experimental social psychology* 40 (1): 193-236.

Chatterjee, Debangana. 2016. "Gendering ISIS and mapping the role of women." *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 3(2): 201-218.

Cobban, Helena. 2015. *Amnesty after atrocity?: Healing nations after genocide and war crimes*. Routledge.

Cockburn, Patrick. 2014. *The Jihadis return: ISIS and the new Sunni uprising*. New York: Or Books.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war." *Oxford economic papers* 56(4): 563-595.

Constitution of Iraq. 2005. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en

Cook, David. 2005. "Women fighting in Jihad?." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28(5): 375-384.

Darley, John M., and Thane S. Pittman. 2003. "The psychology of compensatory and retributive justice." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 7(4): 324-336.

Darley, John M., Kevin M. Carlsmith, and Paul H. Robinson. 2000. "Incapacitation and just deserts as motives for punishment." *Law and Human behavior* 24(6): 659-683.

Davis, Lisa. 2016. "Iraqi Women Confronting ISIL: Protecting Women's Rights in the Context of Conflict." *Swiss Journal of International Law* 22 (1): 27.

Efrati, Noga. 2005. "Negotiating rights in Iraq: Women and the personal status law." *The Middle East Journal* 59(4): 577-595.

Elster, Jon, 2004. *Closing the books: Transitional justice in historical perspective*. Cambridge University Press.

Farwell, James P. 2014. "The media strategy of ISIS." *Survival* 56(6): 49-55.

Fassin, Didier, and Richard Rechtman. 2009. *The empire of trauma: An inquiry into the condition of victimhood*. Princeton University Press.

Gambhir, Harleen K. "Dabiq: The strategic messaging of the Islamic State." 2014. *Institute for the Study of War* 15 (1).

Gentry, Caron E.; Laura J. Shepherd, Laura Sjoberg eds. 2018. *Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security*. Routledge, New York.

Gibson, James L. "Does truth lead to reconciliation? Testing the causal assumptions of the South African truth and reconciliation process." 2004. *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 201-217.

Greenfeld, Lawrence A., and Tracy L. Snell. *Women offenders*. 1999. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Hadzic, Dino, David Carlson, and Margit Tavits. 2017. "How exposure to violence affects ethnic voting." *British journal of political science* (forthcoming): 1-18.

Hewstone, Miles, Mark Rubin, and Hazel Willis. 2002. "Intergroup bias." *Annual review of psychology* 53(1): 575-604.

Ho, Robert, Lynne ForsterLee, Robert ForsterLee, and Natalie Crofts. 2002. "Justice versus vengeance: Motives underlying punitive judgements." *Personality and Individual Differences* 33(3): 365-377.

Hogan, Robert, and Nicholas P. Emler. 1981. "Retributive justice." In *The justice motive in social behavior*, pp. 125-143. Springer, Boston, MA.

Hood, Roger, and Carolyn Hoyle. 2015. *The death penalty: A worldwide perspective*. Oxford University Press.

Human Rights Watch. 2017. Flawed Justice: Accountability for ISIS Crimes in Iraq. https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/12/05/flawed-justice/accountability-isis-crimes-iraq#

Human Rights Watch. 2019. World Report: Iraq. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/iraq

Jacoby, Tami Amanda. 2015. "A theory of victimhood: Politics, conflict and the construction of victim-based identity." *Millennium* 43(2): 511-530.

Jones, Sophia, and Christina Asquith. 2018. "Iraq is Tempting Fate by Punishing Women." Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/25/iraq-is-tempting-fate-by-punishing-women/

Kao, Kristen, and Mara Redlich Revkin. 2018. "To Punish or to Pardon? Reintegrating Rebel Collaborators After Conflict in Iraq." *Reintegrating Rebel Collaborators After Conflict in Iraq (June 23, 2018)*.

Kerr, Rachel, and Eirin Mobekk. 2007. *Peace and justice*. Polity.

King, Anthony. 2017. "Gender and close combat roles." In *The Palgrave international handbook of gender and the military*, pp. 305-317. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Klausen, Jytte. 2015. "Tweeting the Jihad: Social media networks of Western foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38(1): 1-22.

Lahoud, Nelly. 2014. "The neglected sex: the Jihadis' exclusion of women from Jihad." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26(5): 780-802.

Lambourne, Wendy. 2009. "Transitional justice and peacebuilding after mass violence." *International journal of transitional justice* 3(1): 28-48.

Leebaw, Brownwyn Anne. 2008. "The irreconcilable goals of transitional justice." *Human Rights Quarterly.* 30 (1): 95.

Loken, Meredith, and Anna Zelenz. 2018. "Explaining extremism: Western women in Daesh." *European Journal of International Security* 3(1): 45-68.

Lupu, Noam, and Leonid Peisakhin. 2017. "The legacy of political violence across generations." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(4): 836-851.

Marks, Zoe. 2017. "Gender Dynamics in Rebel Groups." *The Palgrave International Handbook of Gender and the Military*. Palgrave Macmillan, London: 437-454.

Mazurana, Dyan E., Susan A. McKay, Khristopher C. Carlson, and Janel C. Kasper. 2002. "Girls in fighting forces and groups: Their recruitment, participation, demobilization, and reintegration." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 8(2): 97-123.

Meernik, James. 2003. "Victor's justice or the law? Judging and punishing at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(2): 140-162.

Messerschmidt, James W. 1993. *Masculinities and Crime: Critique and Reconceptualization of Theory*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Minear, Richard H. 2015. *Victors' justice: Tokyo war crimes trial*. Vol. 1401. Princeton University Press.

Mironova, Vera, and Sam Whitt. 2018. "Social norms after conflict exposure and victimization by violence: Experimental evidence from Kosovo." *British Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 749-765.

Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala. 2012. "Advancing feminist positioning in the field of transitional justice." *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 6(2): 205-228.

Nilsson, Johanna, and Suruchi Thapar-Björkert. 2013. "'People Constantly Remind Me of My Past… and Make Me Look Like a Monster' RE-VISITING DDR THROUGH A CONVERSATION WITH BLACK DIAMOND." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 15(1): 110-118.

Nilsson, Marco. 2018. "Muslim mothers in ground combat against the Islamic State: Women's identities and social change in Iraqi Kurdistan." *Armed Forces & Society* 44(2): 261-279.

Oppenheim, Ben, Abbey Steele, Juan F. Vargas, and Michael Weintraub. 2015. "True believers, deserters, and traitors: Who leaves insurgent groups and why." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, (5): 794-823.

O'Rourke, Catherine. 2013. *Gender politics in transitional justice*. Routledge.

Parkinson, Sarah Elizabeth. 2013. "Organizing rebellion: Rethinking high-risk mobilization and social networks in war." *American Political Science Review* 107(3): 418-432.

Peresin, Anita, and Alberto Cervone. 2015. "The western muhajirat of ISIS." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38(7): 495-509.

Perešin, Anita. 2015. "Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9(3).

Peskin, Victor. 2005. "Beyond Victor's Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda." *Journal of Human Rights* 4(2): 213-231.

Rodman, Kenneth A. 2009. "Is peace in the interests of justice? The case for broad prosecutorial discretion at the International Criminal Court." *Leiden Journal of International Law* 22(1): 99-126.

Poloni-Staudinger, Lori, and Candice D. Ortbals. 2014. *Terrorism and violent conflict: women's agency, leadership, and responses*. Vol. 8. Springer Science & Business Media.

Raynor, Peter, and Gwen Robinson. 2005. *Rehabilitation, crime and justice*. Springer.

Robinson, Gwen, and Iain D. Crow. 2009. *Offender rehabilitation: Theory, research and practice*. Sage.

Rozenas, Arturas, Sebastian Schutte, and Yuri Zhukov. 2017. "The political legacy of violence: The long-term impact of Stalin's repression in Ukraine." *The Journal of Politics* 79(4): 1147-1161.

Speckhard, Anne. 2015. "Female Terrorists in ISIS, Al Qaeda and 21st Century Terrorism." *Trends Research: Inside the Mind of a Jihadist*.

Speckhard, Anne, and Ahmet S. Yayla. 2017. "The ISIS Emni: The Origins and Inner Workings of ISIS's Intelligence Apparatus." *Perspectives on terrorism* 11(1).

Stephan, Walter S., and Cookie White Stephan. 2013. "An integrated threat theory of prejudice." In *Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination*, pp. 33-56. Psychology Press.

Subotic, Jelena. 2009. *Hijacked justice: Dealing with the past in the Balkans*. Cornell University Press.

Tajfel, Henri, Michael G. Billig, Robert P. Bundy, and Claude Flament. 1971. "Social categorization and intergroup behaviour." *European journal of social psychology* 1(2): 149-178.

Taub, Ben 2018. Iraq's Post-ISIS Campaign of Revenge. *The New Yorker*. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge

Teitel, Ruti G. 2000. *Transitional justice*. Oxford University Press.

Thomas, Jakana L., and Kanisha D. Bond. 2015. "Women's participation in violent political organizations." *American Political Science Review* 109(3): 488-506.

Van Ness, Daniel W., and Karen Heetderks Strong. 2014. *Restoring justice: An introduction to restorative justice*. Routledge.

Von Hirsch, Andrew 1976. Doing justice: The choice of punishments. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2006. *Inside rebellion: The politics of insurgent violence*. Cambridge University Press.

Weiss, Michael, and Hassan Hassan. 2016 *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (updated edition)*. Simon and Schuster.

Wilson, Richard A. 2001. *The politics of truth and reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the post-apartheid state*. Cambridge University Press.

Woodward, Rachel, and Claire Duncanson, eds. 2017. *The Palgrave international handbook of gender and the military*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wringe, Bill. 206. "Why punish war crimes? Victor's justice and expressive justifications of punishment." *Law and Philosophy* 25(2): 159-191.

Zimring, Franklin E. 2004. *The contradictions of American capital punishment*. Oxford
University Press.

Summary of Variables

Variable	Description	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Alphapunish isis	alpha score for punishment of ISIS leaders, fighters, foreign fighters, religious police, civil service, combat support, manual laborers, routine police, taxpayers	596	3.13	0.94	1.11	5
Punishment range	Disaggregation of alphapunishisis Into 9 nine choices for each subject	5347	3.13	1.62	1	5
Proportion-ality	Order of categories of importance in ISIS ranging from 1 = someone who payed taxes to ISIS to 9 = ISIS leadership	5347	5.00	2.58	1	9
Punish gender	Punishment choices for ISIS men and women in combined survey vignettes	2370	2.65	1.36	1	5
loyalworker	Nasim 1. Loyal worker, 2. Opportunist worker	593	2.54	1.24	1	5
loyalfighter	Akram 1. Loyal fighter, 2. Opportunist fighter	596	3.78	1.33	1	5
wifeworker	Sara 1. ISIS wife, 2. ISIS worker	596	2.81	1.36	1	5
wifelowhigh	Lina 1. Low-level wife, 2 wife of an ISIS commander	588	2.73	1.40	1	5
treatment	treatment group number	595	1.58	0.49	1	2
mosul	1 = Mosul civilian, 0 = ISIS camp	596	0.67	0.47	0	1
blameattribu tion	Factor variable for blame attribution of ISIS men and women	579	0.00	0.91	-1.86	0.76
blamewome n	Same index, including only female referenced ISIS categories	591	0.00	0.89	-1.59	1.42
threatpercept ion	Factor variable for threat perception of ISIS men vs. women	562	0.00	0.92	-2.20	0.49
victimization	Factor variable for ISIS victimization	596	0.00	0.81	-0.83	0.16
female	1 = female respondent	596	0.22	0.41	0	1
age	Subject age in years	596	34.71	12.75	18	72
education	Education from no formal education to post-secondary	595	2.61	0.91	1	4
income	Income assessment ranges from 1 = Significant difficulties to 4 = cover	596	2.13	0.93	1	4

	expenses and save					
Professional	1 = employer, manager, professional office worker	596	0.26	0.44	0	1
Laborer	1 = manual worker, farmer	596	0.33	0.47	0	1
Student	1 = student	596	0.24	0.43	0	1
Unemployed	1 = currently unemployed	596	0.17	0.38	0	1
moved	0 = lived in Mosul throughout ISIS rule, 1 = moved at some point	596	0.18	0.38	0	1