

Public Tolerance of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Killing of Insurgents: Evidence from Mosul, Iraq

How do civilians perceive the treatment of insurgent forces and their supporters once they are defeated on the battlefield? We ask this question in the context of suspected Islamic State combatants detained by Iraqi government forces in Mosul Iraq. Using survey vignettes, we inquire about public tolerance for judicial execution as well as extrajudicial killing of combatant detainees. We sample among ordinary civilians in Mosul who lived under Islamic State rule as well as ISIS-affiliated families in refugee camps outside Mosul. We find that Mosul civilians are more tolerant of both capital punishment and extrajudicial killing of insurgent combatants compared to ISIS-affiliated families, especially when primed about security threats. However, civilians are more likely to oppose the killing of insurgents if they believe violence is counter-productive to enhancing their overall security. This tension speaks to the security dilemma surrounding retributive justice and its potential consequences for recurrent violence.

What should be done with insurgent combatants once they are defeated on the battlefield? Do publics, who likely suffered under insurgent violence, show any compassion or restraint about how former insurgents are treated? We consider the compelling case of Islamic State (ISIS) detainees in the aftermath of the 2017 liberation of Mosul, Iraq. The harsh treatment of suspected ISIS loyalists by the Iraqi government, as well as ordinary civilians taking the law into their own hands, has been described by journalists and human rights organizations as a campaign of revenge (Taub 2018; HRW 2017; 2019). We investigate the extent to which ordinary Mosul civilians, who were subject to numerous abuses at the hands of ISIS insurgents, show any restraint about killing suspected ISIS insurgents. In a survey of nearly 600 Mosul residents including people with ISIS affiliations displaced in camps outside Mosul, we examine public tolerance of extrajudicial killing and the use of capital punishment in Iraqi courts against ISIS detainees who were captured or surrendered on the battlefield.

First, we find that Mosul civilians are more tolerant of extrajudicial killing of ISIS supporters than people in IDP camps with ISIS-affiliations. However, Mosul civilians are sensitive to the motive for extra-judicial killing, punishing perpetrators at higher rates for revenge-based as opposed to security-based motives. This suggests publics are wary of civilians taking the law into their own hands as part of an informal campaign of revenge against ISIS.

Instead, we find greater support among Mosul civilians for formal, state-sanctioned violence in the form of capital punishment of ISIS detainees via the Iraqi judicial system. However, Mosul civilians are less likely to see the process as procedurally or substantively fair if detainees voluntarily surrendered as opposed to being captured on the battlefield by Iraqi forces. We also find that civilians are less likely to see the execution of insurgents as just or fair if they believe that offering concessions to ISIS might encourage more fighters to demobilize. Hence,

our research underscores linkages between public support for formal and informal violence against insurgents during the transitional justice process and prospects for lasting peace.

Literature

With ongoing counter-terror and counter-insurgency actions around the world, there is a growing interest in state, paramilitary, and civilian-driven violence against suspected insurgents and their supporters. Drawing on the broader literature on violence against civilians during conflict, Eck and Hultman (2007) find that many governments are prone to commit one-sided violence against civilians, especially against those with suspected ties to insurgencies. However, indiscriminate use of violence by the state against civilians has been generally viewed as counterproductive to fighting insurgencies (Sambanis et al. 2012; Souleimanov and Siroky 2016, though see Lyall 2009). At present, little is known about the strategic value of either judicial or extrajudicial killings in the context of ongoing counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist actions employed by states, and whether they are an effective tool for achieving those goals (Byman 2005; Hafez and Hatfield 2006).

Here, we explore two distinct literatures on judicial and extrajudicial violence against insurgents which we believe merit further integration. The case for greater synergy among these two literatures is compelling in part for the inter-play of formal and informal mechanisms and actors involved in carrying out and adjudicating violence, and limited comparative analysis of public support for the use of violence to counter terrorism and insurgency.

The first literature examines extra-judicial killing of insurgents. Much of it tends to be very state-centric, focusing on the legal justification for the use of deadly force as well as the

underlying motivation of the state to target individual insurgents (Melzer 2008). Recent studies have examined the use of targeted killings as part of anti-terrorist actions. Ketzmer (2005) argues that a legal interpretation based on international human rights law would prohibit extrajudicial killing of insurgents, while international humanitarian law is more permissive of targeted killing of insurgents, citing examples of Israeli anti-terrorist actions and US drone attacks. Others disagree that there is any legal basis for extra-judicial killing under international law (McKelvey 2011). In terms of motivation, Kessler and Wouter (2008) interpret extra-judicial killing as a form of “risk management”, where states engage in targeted killings based on a precautionary legal reasoning about uncertainty and imminent threat, which Guiora (2004) refers to as “active self-defense”. At the same time, there is a push to hold states more accountable in their treatment of suspected insurgents through the development of legal due process mechanisms, including those imposed against the United States in landmark Supreme Court cases of *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* and *Boumediene v. Bush* (Murphy and Afsheen 2009). But there remains contention over the ability of the state to legally target individual citizens for extrajudicial killing, as evidenced by the case of Anwar Al-Awlaki (Chesney 2010; Ramsden 2011).

Beyond the state, scholars are increasingly turning attention to the role of paramilitary and informal civilian actors who carry out such activities with the implicit support or passive acceptance of the state in an effort to more effectively drain the sea of insurgents and suspected terrorists (Staniland 2012; Jentzsch et al. 2015; Carey et al. 2015; Cohen and Nordås 2015). However, the danger of empowering informal state actors to take the law into their own hands either individually or in organized groups manifests through increased human rights violations and propensity for strategic mass violence (Mitchell et al. 2014; Ore 2017). Little is presently known about public tolerance of such eliminationist strategies in dealing with insurgents.

The second literature we examine focuses on judicial killing of insurgents via formal trials and resulting executions. States may also engage in violence against insurgents through the criminal justice system. However, unlike the extrajudicial paradigm, this strategy offers combatant detainees to (at least the appearance of) due process under law (Orentlicher and Goldman 2001; Conestaro 2004). Such strategies have often involved bringing combatant detainees before domestic criminal courts (Smith et al. 2002), military commissions (Mundis 2002) or before international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court (Akhavan 2005). Outcomes of such proceedings vary according to the penology guidelines of different judicial systems. Restorative justice approaches of the truth and reconciliation format are essentially a form of amnesty (Wilson 2001; Braithwaite 2002; Gibson 2004; Cobban 2015). Rehabilitative justice typically involves some form of prison sentence followed by reintegration into society (Raynor and Robinson 2005; Robinson and Crow 2009), while retributive justice may include life-long sentences or capital punishment and can serve both punitive and deterrent purposes (Darley et al. 2000; Darley and Pittman 2003; Hood and Hoyle 2015). States may also exploit judicial punishment for political gain through show trials, where the outcome is essentially predetermined and a trial only has the trappings of due process (Szász 1971; Koskenniemi 2002; Koestler 2015). Little is known, however, about how publics, especially in insurgent-affect areas, view such legal strategies for dealing with insurgent violence.¹

In summary, there is a surprising lack of integration between the literature on extrajudicial versus prosecutorial strategies in dealing with insurgent violence as well as

¹ A related issue is whether publics are more supportive of judicial vs. extrajudicial methods for dealing with insurgent violence, especially when either both methods may involve certain violations of procedural or substantive due process.

empirical examination of public support for either or both processes. Our research aims to bridge these important but hitherto disparate focuses and address gaps in the literature with new evidence from insurgent-affected areas. In our study we consider how publics in conflict environments may support informal extrajudicial as well as formal judicially-sanctioned killing of insurgent combatant detainees, with implications for transitional justice and long-term peace and stability (Teitel 2000, 2015; Elster 2004).

Theory and Hypotheses

We consider public support for acts of formal and informal violence against insurgent detainees. We focus on informal violence involving extrajudicial killing of insurgents by civilians and formal violence against insurgents through capital punishment handed down by state courts. If policy toward detainees is ultimately made by states and their security services, why should public opinion matter? In a recent review article, Valentino (2014) underscores the instrumental goals and objectives of elites in power to explaining violence against civilians. We argue that public opposition or support could provide an important foundation for entrepreneurial elites to legitimate strategic goals and objectives against insurgents and their supporters. Both judicial and extrajudicial killing could be linked to furthering holistic eliminationist (i.e. “drain the sea”) strategies against insurgents (Valentino et al. 2004). If publics are generally condoning of extrajudicial killing, then elites may escape accountability for allowing their militaries and security services to violate the laws of war, as well as paramilitaries and ordinary civilians to take the law into their own hands. If publics are supporting of harsh punishment of insurgent

detainees, then elites may justify state-sanctioned killing (via capital punishment) as fulfilling the will of the people, regardless of due process violations and the rule of law.

To explain why publics would support both legal and extra-legal efforts to punish insurgent detainees, we consider plausible arguments based on grievances and security.² In surveying the literature on violence against civilians, Valentino (2014) divides perspectives into psychologically driven grievances and rational, strategic behavior. We first apply this conventional binary distinction to understand public tolerance of judicial and extra-judicial killing. On one hand, civilians may support violence against former insurgent combatants because they hold grievances against them. Grievances might explain why publics who oppose insurgent groups would discount concerns about killing insurgents, as they are out to settle scores.³ We test the following hypothesis:

H1 (Grievances): Grievances increase public tolerance of judicial and extra-judicial killing of insurgent detainees.

In terms of mechanisms, we focus on victimization and blame attribution. Victimization provides a substantive cause for grievances against insurgents, but blame attribution provides the

² Note that our hypotheses do not compare the relative preferences of extra-judicial vs. judicial strategies for dealing with insurgents. Instead, we focus on common factors that might underscore support for both measures as part of a combined eliminationist i.e. “draining the sea” strategy. We elaborate on this point further in the research design.

³ In addition to Valentino (2014), see Cederman et al. (2013) for a detailed review of the vast grievance-based literature for civil war violence.

link between victimization and targeting of grievances against insurgents. At the individual-level, personal victimization at the hands of insurgents coupled with blame attribution should reinforce a grievance-based hypothesis killing of insurgents. We would anticipate that victims of violence would be more revenge-seeking against insurgent detainees than non-victims, and thus more willing to support both legal and extra-legal killing of insurgent detainees.⁴

As a counter-hypothesis, we consider whether support for both judicial and extra-judicial killing could be rational or strategic in nature. Insurgents likely pose a continued threat to stability in the aftermath of civil conflict. Publics may be especially sensitive to the prospect of future insurgent threats, leading them to justify violence against insurgents as much for deterrence as for punishment. Post-war elites may have incentives to follow the “will of the people” in condoning violence against insurgents as a politically popular method for increasing support in the name of threats to security. We test the following hypothesis

H2 (Security Threats) Security concerns increase public tolerance of judicial and extra-judicial killing of insurgent detainees.

In terms of mechanisms, we focus on threat perception and willingness to condone the use of violence for the sake of security. People who feel more threatened by insurgents may support the use of judicial as well as extrajudicial measures to eliminate them. They may justify the use of violence as necessary and in accordance with the need for public safety and security over concerns about insurgent human rights or the rule of law.

⁴ Another possibility is that individuals blame insurgents for collective crimes against a civilian population and justify killing insurgents on behalf of collective grievances.

Finally, we consider whether publics fully appreciate the consequences of violence against insurgents for long-term peace and stability. While some might view killing insurgents as either a just response to avenge grievances or a sound security strategy, others might regard judicial and extra-judicial killing as ultimately counter-productive to demobilizing and defeating insurgent forces. Here, we turn to security dilemma explanations of violence where efforts to increase one's security can have the unintended consequence of making one's actual security worse off (Jervis 1971; Posen 1993). Evidence shows that violence against civilians has been counterproductive for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations, driving more people into insurgent ranks and prolonging conflict (Sambanis et al. 2012; Souleimanov and Siroky 2016). We argue that if publics understand this potential security dilemma, they will be less likely to support acts of violence against insurgents, especially when insurgents signal willingness to peacefully surrender. We test the following hypothesis:

H3 (Security Dilemmas). Awareness of security dilemmas decreases public tolerance of judicial and extra-judicial killing of insurgent detainees.

In terms of mechanisms underlying security dilemma awareness, we focus on whether publics believe that insurgents would stop fighting if granted concessions. We argue that individuals who think concessions might incentivize insurgents to surrender are more likely to view judicial and extra-judicial killing as counter-productive. In contrast, individuals who firmly believe that insurgents will never stop fighting, regardless of concessions, should be more favorable to the logic of H1 or H2, supporting judicial and extra-judicial killing as a justifiable means to combat ruthless and relentless insurgent violence.

In summary, we examine whether public tolerance for violence against insurgent detainees is likely conditional to grievances and concerns about security. We now turn to our case study, the treatment of Islamic State insurgents and their supporters in the aftermath of the liberation of Mosul, Iraq.

Rationale for Case Study

Mosul, Iraq provides a compelling case for gauging public opinion regarding judicial as well as extra-judicial killing. The Islamic State ruled over Mosul with brutal efficiency from 2014-2017 utilizing both judicial and extra-judicial violence to impose order (Abdulrazaq and Stansfield 2016). The liberation of Mosul destroyed nearly half the city (West Mosul), and upended much of the civilian population, which had not already fled ISIS rule. The liberation itself was a drawn-out door-to-door street fight with insurgents, during which Iraqi forces showed their own propensity for brutality against suspected ISIS fighters and civilian supporters. Human rights groups have documented widespread violations in the treatment of ISIS supports during and after the liberation to include extra-judicial killings and arbitrary judicial executions following detention, torture, forced confessions, and mock trials with no pretense to the rule of law (Belkis 2017; Human Rights Watch 2017; 2019). Taub (2018) refers to the process as a “campaign of revenge”.

Even before ISIS, judicial executions and extra-judicial violence were prevalent in Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein, political opponents were often executed following elaborate show trials, torture, and forced confessions (Blaydes 2018). After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the death penalty was briefly suspended, only to be reinstated by the Iraqi government in 2004. Since then,

a number of high profile insurgents, terrorists, and former Baathists have been executed, most notably Saddam Hussein himself (Parker 2005). The post-2003 invasion also unleashed a torrent of extra-judicial violence.⁵ Based on the Iraqi Body Count database, Hicks et al. (2011) estimate that between 2003 and 2008, 92,614 Iraqi civilians died as a direct result of insurgent/counter-insurgent violence, of which 74% were killed by unknown perpetrators. 19,321 of those civilian deaths were in the form of extra-judicial killings by unknown agents, in some cases involving torture before execution (5,697).⁶ Given the prevalence of both judicial and extra-judicial killing prior to, during, and after ISIS occupation, we argue that Iraq is a useful case to understand public tolerance of extra-judicial violence against suspected insurgents.

In our study, we examine public tolerance of judicial execution as well as extra-judicial killing of ISIS members. Such concerns are common to many cases of transitional justice beyond the Iraqi case (Teitel 2000; 2015). Specifically, publics who desire revenge against insurgent forces and their supporters could encourage entrepreneurial elites to pursue harsh retribution against insurgents for political gain. This could include prosecutorial zeal in handing down capital punishment to insurgent detainees regardless of due process considerations, as well as failure to prevent extrajudicial killings of insurgents and their supporters. Elites might actively encourage such eliminationist practices in order to “drain the sea”, possibly giving fuel to

⁵ Before ISIS, Staniland (2012) considered the case of ethnic defection related to Sunni on Sunni violence in Iraq, between insurgent and pro-state supporters.

⁶ Far fewer deaths were directly attributable to Coalition (12%) and Anti-Coalition forces (11%). Only a handful of extra-judicial killings were attributed to Coalition (54) and Anti-Coalition forces (316) during that period by Hicks et al. (2011).

insurgencies they seek to stamp out (Downes 2007; Valentino 2004; 2014). Within this context, we now turn to specifics of our research design.

Research Design – Public Support for Extrajudicial Killing

We examine public support for judicial and extrajudicial killing employing two distinct research designs.⁷ These designs capture public responses to two dimensions of counterinsurgency violence, formal and informal. In the extrajudicial design, we focus on public tolerance of informal counter-insurgency violence against insurgents. In the judicial killing design, we examine public support for legalized, state-sanctioned violence against insurgents.

To investigate public tolerance of extra-judicial killing of ISIS insurgents, we employ a survey vignette experiment. We use a vignette as an indirect measure of support for extra-judicial killing due to concerns about self-censoring with direct measures. In the extra-judicial killing vignette, subjects are asked to make a decision about how to punish a local Mosul civilian named Ali, who is accused of killing a suspected an ISIS supporter after the liberation of Mosul.

⁷ An alternative design strategy would be for us to compare the relative strength of public support for judicial vs. extra-judicial killing using an integrated research design. However, we worried that social desirability bias might lead respondents to downplay support for extra-judicial killing vis-à-vis judicial execution. We suspect most civilians would favor judicial executions over unlawful extra-judicial killing, though this remains to be empirically tested. Instead, we offer two distinct designs, focusing on common factors that might encourage public tolerance of both judicial and extra-judicial killing as party of a holistic “kill them any way you can” strategy of eliminationism.

Subjects receive one of the two versions of the vignette, randomly determined. The treatment conditions compare punishment preferences depending on Ali's motives for the killing: revenge or security, which are consistent with theoretical rationales for civilian violence discussed in the literature (Valentino 2014) and provide an initial test of Hypotheses 1 and 2. The grievance and security treatments are as follows:

1. Grievances Treatment

After the liberation of Mosul, witnesses have come forward claiming that a local civilian named Ali killed an ISIS supporter in his neighborhood. Witnesses claim that he was motivated by revenge. If the claims are true, what do you think should be done with Ali?

2. Security Treatment

After the liberation of Mosul, witnesses have come forward claiming that a local civilian named Ali killed an ISIS supporter in his neighborhood. Witnesses claim that he was motivated to prevent ISIS from using his neighborhood to plan future attacks. If the claims are true, what do you think should be done with Ali?

Responses options in both cases range from 1 = amnesty, he should be pardoned, 2 = short-term prison sentence, 3 = a long-term prison sentence, 4 = life in prison, or 5 = the death penalty. If subjects are more sensitive to grievances against ISIS (H1) than security threats (H2), then they should favor lesser punishment for Ali when killing an ISIS supporter for revenge. Beyond treatment effects, we can also assess punishment preferences based on one's affiliation with ISIS, which we proxy by comparing different sampling locations in and around Mosul.

Specifically, we argue that many ISIS supporters were purged from Mosul after the liberation into IDP camps, such that ordinary civilians who remain inside Mosul after the liberation are more likely to have experienced ISIS victimization and more opposed to ISIS, while refugees displaced into camps are more supportive of ISIS due in part to familial and personal affiliations with the organization. We can also evaluate grievance-based motivations using items in our survey measuring ISIS victimization and blame attribution of ordinary ISIS supporters for ISIS crimes. Victimization, blame attribution, and lack of ISIS affiliation could amplify support for Ali, resulting in lower punishment preferences in the grievance treatment.

In contrast, if subjects are more concerned about security (H2) than revenge (H1), they should favor lesser punishment for Ali when the motive for killing is to protect his neighborhood from future attack. Beyond treatment effects, we can also explore whether one's degree of ISIS affiliation serves as an indicator of security concerns, proxied by sampling location. Ordinary civilians in Mosul may be more likely to see ISIS as a threat than those with ISIS affiliations in refugee camps outside Mosul. They may therefore be more tolerant of extra-judicial killing for security-driven rationales compared to people with ISIS affiliations in the camps. To further assess security motivations, we employ survey instruments measuring justification for using violence to satisfy "the will of the people" or for a "just cause". Subjects who feel more threatened by ISIS should be more willing to justify the use of violence, and therefore less likely to punish Ali for eliminating a potential ISIS security threat.

Finally, according to H3, we would expect subjects who believe extra-judicial killings are ultimately counter-productive will be more likely to punishing Ali for taking the law into his own hands, regardless of his motives. To evaluate our security dilemma hypothesis, we ask subject whether they believe ISIS would surrender under certain conditions, and we assess

whether that belief makes them more opposed to eliminationist practices, leading to harsher punishment preferences. Collectively, our survey instruments and sampling protocols will help us identify grievance, security, and security dilemma dimensions of public tolerance for extra-judicial killing.

Research Design – Public Support for Judicial Killing

To investigate public support for judicial execution of ISIS detainees, we employ a second survey vignette that focuses on public perceptions of the fairness of judicial outcomes involving capital punishment for ISIS detainees. Our vignette presents the case of an ISIS fighter named Fadhil, who is standing trial for his role in ISIS. The key treatment is whether Fadhil has voluntarily surrendered or was captured on the battlefield. However, the outcome of the trial is the same. Fadhil is given the death sentence, and we ask respondents to react to this verdict under different capture vs. surrender treatment conditions. The text of the vignette is provided below:

1. Capture Treatment

During the liberation of Mosul, Fadhil was an ISIS fighter who was captured by Iraqi Army forces during a firefight on the battlefield. At his trial, Fadhil had a lawyer and was able to speak in his defense. The judge decided to sentence Fadhil to death.

2. Surrender Treatment

During the liberation of Mosul, Fadhil was an ISIS fighter who voluntarily surrendered to Iraq Army forces without fighting. At his trial, Fadhil had a lawyer and was able to speak in his defense. The judge decided to sentence Fadhil to death.

After the subject is read the randomly assigned vignette, the enumerator asks whether the subject agrees or disagrees with the following five statements “He [Fadhil] had a fair trial”, “He [Fadhil] was guilty”, “Witnesses were telling the truth”, “The judge made the right decision”, “The sentence was proportional to the crime”, and “The sentence was motivated by revenge”. Response options range from Definitely Yes, Probably Yes, Probably Not, and Definitely Not for each item.

We anticipate that our capture treatment could evoke a greater sense of anger and threat than our voluntarily surrender treatment, leading to potentially greater tolerance of judicial execution consistent with the logic of H1 or H2. If subjects are motivated by grievances (H1) they may be more supportive of capital punishment if they see Fadhil as a hardened fighter captured on the battlefield than one who voluntarily surrendered. Survey items measuring victimization, blame attribution should help identify underlying grievances against insurgents. In contrast, subjects who are motivated by security threats (H2) could also be more accepting of the death penalty in the capture treatment than in the voluntary surrender treatment. We use items in the survey measuring beliefs about the use of the death penalty for certain crimes to reveal motives for dealing with security threats. Finally, if subjects are concerned about the security dilemma implications of executing ISIS combatants (H3), they may also be wary of supporting capital punishment under the surrender treatment. If ISIS fighters who voluntarily surrender are still ultimately executed, why not keep fighting? We measure awareness of such security

dilemmas by asking respondents whether they believe ISIS would surrender if offered concessions to include foregoing of capital punishment. In general, we predict that ISIS affiliates in IDP camps should be more opposed to capital punishment, regardless of treatment conditions, than Mosul civilians. However, we probe for whether some Mosul civilians might also consider how the death penalty could be counter-productive to incentivizing ISIS to stop fighting. With these two designs in place, we now turn to data collection and sampling.

Sampling and Data Collection

We conducted our research in two primary locations: the city of Mosul and in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) outside Mosul. Sampling inside Mosul enabled us to capture the perspectives of ordinary civilians who had lived under ISIS rule but who generally welcomed liberation by the Iraqi military in 2017. Sampling in IDP camps allowed us to compare perspectives of ordinary civilians to those with stronger ISIS affiliations. The comparison is especially helpful for understanding how grievances and security concerns, as well as ISIS loyalty, might impact support for judicial and extrajudicial killing.


The Mosul survey was conducted between December 23-30, 2018 in eleven neighborhoods in both East and West Mosul, and the IDP camp survey was carried out between January 10-25, 2019 in three out of fifteen IDP camps on the outskirts of Mosul (See Online Appendix for further sampling details). Neighborhoods in the Mosul study were randomly selected, while IDP camps were purposively sampled based on common knowledge about which camps were typically housing ISIS affiliates and their families who fled Mosul after the liberation. Residents of the camps, which are administered by the Iraqi military, are free to come

and go, but most stay in the camps because their homes in Mosul are destroyed, they have nowhere else to go, and may fear retribution for their role in ISIS should they return to Mosul.

To assess ISIS affiliation in the camps, we asked respondents a series of questions about whether they or their family members fought or worked for ISIS. Although there may be self-censoring of responses, a total of 91% of IDP camp respondents indicated some form of ISIS affiliation to include having worked for ISIS (21%), fought for ISIS (17%), having family members who worked for ISIS (55%) and having family members who were put on trial for their role in ISIS (64%). In contrast, no one in the Mosul city survey indicated an ISIS affiliation, which could be at least partially due to self-censorship. As an additional check on ISIS sympathy in the camps relative to Mosul civilians, we asked all respondents how much they trusted the Iraqi government, and to assess the level of support ISIS enjoyed within the city of Mosul before liberation.⁸ Figure 1 shows that mean trust in the Iraqi government is significantly higher in Mosul compared to IDP camps, while beliefs about ISIS support in Mosul are significantly greater in IDP camps compared to the Mosul sample. These stark differences help validate our claim that the Mosul sample is comprised largely of individuals who opposed ISIS, while the IDP camp sample represents people who supported and were affiliated with ISIS in some way.

Figure 1. ISIS vs. Iraqi Government Support in Mosul and IDP Camp Samples

⁸ We use this instrument as a proxy for direct measures of ISIS support due to concerns about social desirability bias in revealing ISIS loyalties. Instead, we argue that people who supported ISIS may be more likely to see others in Mosul as having supported ISIS as a form of psychological projection.




Finally, the IDP camp and Mosul city samples reflect certain demographic imbalances that typify conventional wisdom about ISIS supporters. The IDP camp sample is of lower income and education, and has fewer female participants (24% vs. 17% respectively). The samples are more balanced on age and labor demographics (See online appendix). We will control for imbalances in subsequent analysis, but the samples provide a window into two worlds of ISIS support and opposition in Mosul, with likely implications for how judicial and extra-judicial killings are perceived.

Results – Public Support for Extra-Judicial Killing

We begin by examining results from our extra-judicial killing vignette experiment for the case of Ali, a local Iraqi who is accused of killing of an ISIS supporter in his neighborhood. In one version, witnesses claim Ali killed the ISIS supporter for revenge, while in the other version, his motives are to protect his neighborhood from a future attack. Punishment options for Ali range from 1 = amnesty, 2 = short-term prison sentence, 3 = long-term prison sentence, 4 = life imprisonment to 5 = death penalty. T-tests indicate that the average punishment in the revenge treatment is significantly greater than in the security treatment ($t = 6.11$, $p < 0.0000$). The average punishment ranges between a short and long-term prison sentence in the revenge treatment (mean = 2.58, sd = 1.14) compared to short-term prison in the security threat treatment (mean = 1.98, sd = 1.23). However, these averages are deceiving when comparing across Mosul city and IDP camp subsamples. Figure 2 reports the mean responses to the grievances and security treatments for Mosul civilians vs. IDP camp residents. In both subsamples, there is greater support for punishment in the grievance treatment than in the security threat treatment, but the treatment effect is stronger among Mosul civilians ($t = 15.08$, $p < 0.0000$) than IDP camp respondents ($t = 2.39$, $p < 0.0096$). IDP camp members generally prefer long-term to life imprisonment for an extra-judicial killing, while Mosul civilians favor more short-term sentences in the grievance treatment to even amnesty in the case of the security threat treatment.

Figure 2. Extra-Judicial Killing Vignette Treatment Effects by Location



Overall, the survey vignette indicates that respondents are more willing to condone extra-judicial killing when motivated by security threats (H2) than grievances (H1). To further explore grievance vs. security motives as well as awareness of possible security dilemmas created by extra-judicial killing (H3), we turn to multiple regression models. Table 1 provides results from ordinary least squares regression (OLS) where the dependent variable is an ordered variable of punishment preferences ranging from 1 = amnesty to 5 = death penalty for extra-judicial killing in the survey vignette. Model 1 indicates the basic security treatment effect, showing that subjects are less willing to punish Ali when motivated by ISIS security threats (H2) than by personal grievances (H1). Model 2 shows that Mosul civilians, who are generally opposed to ISIS, select less severe punishments for extra-judicial killing than IDP camp members, many of whom have ISIS affiliations. Finally, Model 3 includes demographic controls as well as variables

that might help clarify mechanisms underlying grievances, security threat, and security dilemma concerns about extra-judicial killing. The control for Mosul is excluded here due to multicollinearity with grievance and security items. Mosul civilians are more likely to blame ordinary ISIS supporters for ISIS crimes, to see the use of violence as justifiable, and to express doubt about ISIS willingness to surrender, even if granted concessions compared to those in IDP camps.⁹

In terms of grievance mechanisms (H1), there is mixed support in Model 3. We do not find a direct correlation between victimization by ISIS (as measured by an index of self-reported victimization events) and punishment preferences. However, we do find a relationship between ISIS blame attribution and support for extra-judicial killing. Individuals who place greater blame on ordinary ISIS members for crimes committed by ISIS are less punitive of extra-judicial killing. There is also mixed support for security threat-related mechanistic explanations (H2). To understand security-related preferences for violence, we ask respondents if they agree that “it is sometimes necessary to use violence to support a just cause” and “the will of the people is more important than the rule of law”. We find that the second item predicts lesser punishment preferences related to extra-judicial killing, which suggests how some respondents might justify violence as necessary for public safety (see Appendix Table 1 for additional coding details on independent variables).

Finally, we find support for H3 using an index measuring belief about whether ISIS would surrender if granted concession. Respondents were asked whether they think ISIS would surrender if offered amnesty, pardoned, promised a fair trial, offered protections against torture, a suspension of the death penalty, among other guarantees. The index ranges from 1 = definitely

⁹ See online appendix for further detail on Mosul vs. IDP camp comparisons.

not to 4 = definitely yes. Model 3 indicates that subjects who believe ISIS would surrender if offered concessions are more willing to punish extra-judicial killing, which suggests that they see extra-judicial killing as counter-productive to the long-term interests of demobilizing ISIS. This underscores the linkages between extra-judicial killing and the potential for future violence in people's minds. Among demographic control, only age is negatively correlated with punishment support.

Table 1. Punishment for Extra-Judicial Killing (OLS regression)

VARIABLES	(1) Support Punishment	(2) Support Punishment	(3) Support Punishment
Security txt	-0.597*** (0.0978)	-0.976*** (0.0763)	-0.887*** (0.0880)
Mosul		-1.739*** (0.0849)	
ISIS concessions			0.360*** (0.0637)
Violence just			-0.0353 (0.0500)
Will of people			-0.225*** (0.0467)
Blame ISIS civilians			-0.403*** (0.0471)
victimization			-0.0139 (0.0494)
female			-0.0476 (0.1000)
age			-0.00756** (0.00385)
education			0.00177 (0.0508)
income			0.0110 (0.0602)
professional			-0.0625 (0.139)
laborer			0.0462 (0.131)
unemployed			0.118

			(0.126)
moved			-0.134
			(0.0911)
Constant	3.177***	4.947***	4.903***
	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.451)
Observations	595	595	592
R-squared	0.058	0.477	0.387
adj. r2	0.0562	0.475	0.372

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In summary, public tolerance of extra-judicial killing of ISIS members appears conditional to motive. We find subjects are less likely to tolerate killing for grievance-based motives (H1) than out of security threat (H2). However, publics are also aware of the potential conflict of interest that arises from extra-judicial killing of suspected ISIS supporters. Consistent with H3, those who believe ISIS would stop fighting if granted meaningful concessions are less likely to support extra-judicial killing as a rationale for increasing security. Instead, they appear to sense an inherent security dilemma where killing ISIS supporters may only strengthen ISIS’s resolve to continue fighting.


Results – Public Support for Judicial Killing

We now turn to our judicial killing vignette, which presents the case of Fadhil, an ISIS fighter who is standing trial before an Iraqi court. The key treatment is whether Fadhil is captured or voluntarily surrenders to Iraqi forces on the battlefield. In this vignette, the outcome of the trial is the same for both treatments: the judge sentences Fadhil to death. Respondents are then asked a series of five questions regarding the fairness of his trial, whether they think the judge made the right decision, whether the sentence was proportional to the crime, whether the

sentence was motivated by revenge, and whether they would have preferred an alternative sentence to death ranging from 1 = amnesty to 4 = life imprisonment, consistent with the options in the previous punishment vignette (excluding the death penalty). Factor analysis indicated that responses to these items aligned on one clear dimension, and we combine responses into an index of support for the execution of an ISIS detainee (see Online Appendix for more details).

When comparing basic treatment effects across this execution support index, we find that subjects in the surrender treatment are less likely to see capital punishment as a fair outcome than those in the capture treatment (12.37, $p < 0.0000$). However, Figure 3, shows that the treatment effect only applies to a subsample of Mosul civilians ($t = 11.31$, $p < 0.0000$). There is no significant treatment effect for respondents in IDP camps outside Mosul ($t = 0.99$, $p < 0.1624$). Compared to Mosul civilians, IDP camp members do not see the outcome of capital punishment as either just or fair regardless of the circumstances of how the ISIS fighter was detained. In both treatments, many IDP camp respondents favor either a long-term (58%), a short-term prison sentence (24%) or even amnesty (15%) in lieu of the death penalty. In contrast, Mosul civilians are much more accepting of capital punishment in general than IDP camp members, but especially when the detainee has been captured as opposed to surrendering voluntarily. In the capture treatment, most Mosul civilians could accept a life sentence (79%) or long-term incarceration (13%) as an alternative to capital punishment. In the surrender treatment, a slim majority (54%) still support a life sentence, but nearly one-third (32%) would support long-term imprisonment as an alternative to death.

Figure 3. Judicial Killing Vignette Treatment Effects by Location



To what extent do these treatment effects capture underlying grievances, security threats or security dilemmas outlined in our three hypotheses? To further explore mechanisms underlying public support for judicial execution, we turn to regression models. Table 2 provides OLS estimates of the effect of our experimental treatments on tolerance of judicial killing based on our execution support index, which ranges from 1 = low support for the trial outcome to 4 = high support. Model 1 indicates the basic treatment effect where subjects are less supportive of the outcome in the surrender treatment than in the capture treatment. Model 2 indicates that that Mosul civilians are more supportive of the death penalty outcome than those in the IDP camps. Finally, Model 3 attempts to unpack grievance vs. security motivations behind public support.

The Mosul control is again excluded due to multi-collinearity with blame and security IVs. Mosul civilians are more willing to attribute blame to ordinary civilians for ISIS crimes, more willing to justify the death penalty for certain crimes, and less likely to believe ISIS would surrender if granted concessions than subjects in IDP camps.¹⁰

Model 3 shows that victimization and blame attribution are not significant predictors of public support, which undermines some of the grievance-based logic of H1. To explore security mechanisms underlying H2, we ask people whether they agree that “the death penalty is just for certain crimes” which we find positively correlated with support for capital punishment in the vignette. Finally, our analysis lends support to H3. Model 3 indicates that subjects who believe ISIS would surrender if offered concessions (using the same index as in Table 1) are less likely to see the death penalty outcome as fair. Similarly, those who agree that “court trials are biased against those suspected of supporting ISIS” are more opposed to the use of capital punishment (See Appendix Table 1 for coding). Collectively, these instruments suggest how some subjects perceive capital punishment to be counter-productive to long-term security interests. This is consistent with our results from the extra-judicial killing vignette and suggests a common theme in terms of how civilians appreciate the potential consequences of judicial and extra-judicial killing of insurgents. Among demographic controls, age is correlated with increased support for execution. Higher income is also predictive of stronger support for execution, which is consistent with demographic variation among government and ISIS supporters in Mosul city versus IDP camps.

¹⁰ See online appendix for further detail on Mosul vs. IDP camp comparisons.

Table 2. Fairness of Capital Punishment (OLS regression)

VARIABLES	(1) Support execution	(2) Support execution	(3) Support execution
Surrender txt	-0.847*** (0.0684)	-0.634*** (0.0612)	-0.576*** (0.0642)
Mosul		0.978*** (0.0611)	
ISIS concessions			-0.275*** (0.0445)
Courts biased			-0.153*** (0.0385)
Death penalty just			0.0728** (0.0291)
Blame ISIS			0.0246 (0.0313)
victimization			0.0142 (0.0415)
female			-0.0853 (0.0763)
age			0.00570** (0.00260)
education			-0.0152 (0.0361)
income			0.151*** (0.0399)
professional			0.0425 (0.0977)
laborer			-0.0790 (0.0960)
unemployed			0.101 (0.0968)
moved			0.00362 (0.0749)
Constant	4.209*** (0.113)	3.214*** (0.117)	4.041*** (0.263)
Observations	595	595	591
R-squared	0.205	0.438	0.491
adj. r2	0.204	0.437	0.479

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Discussion and Conclusion

Our analysis has shown that publics are more willing to tolerate judicial and extra-judicial killing of insurgents when they perceive insurgents as a security threat, but many are also mindful of potential security dilemmas of targeting ISIS insurgents for death. For those who believe that ISIS would surrender if granted certain protections from harsh and arbitrary punishment, judicial and extra-judicial killing is viewed as counter-productive to long-term security goals.

Our results have important implications within and beyond the Iraqi case. Within Iraq, our findings suggest that Mosul civilians do not clearly support a widespread campaign of revenge against ISIS. In contrast, ordinary Moslawis, many of whom are victims of ISIS aggression, are wary of civilians taking the law into their own hands out of revenge. While they are more permissive of security-driven motives for extra-judicial violence, some Moslawis also understand how killing ISIS detainees (both extra-judicially as well as judicially) could potentially embolden the organization, and favor lesser punishments as inducements for ISIS to surrender. Their intuition appears borne out by IDP camp members with ISIS affiliations, who are strongly opposed to the use of both capital punishment and extrajudicial killing of ISIS as a response to perceived security threats. A number of respondents in both groups seem to understand the inherent security dilemma of how violence against ISIS detainees will likely embolden the resolve of the organization to keep recruiting and fighting.

Beyond Iraq, our results speak to the importance of transitional justice as a peacebuilding strategy. Effective transitional justice programs move beyond retributive justice (revenge and

retribution) to offer opportunities for rehabilitation and even reconciliation after violence (Elster 2004; Olsen et al. 2010; Teitel 2000, 2015) Our results show that publics may intuitively understand how offering concessions to insurgents could lead to more effective insurgency demobilization and durable peace. The alternative, where governments turn a blind eye to extra-judicial violence and condone violence through arbitrary adjudication in pursuit of justice, will most likely fuel the insurgencies they are ostensibly trying to quell.

References

- Abdulrazaq, Tallha, and Gareth Stansfield. (2016) "The Enemy Within: ISIS and the Conquest of Mosul." *The Middle East Journal* 70(4): 525-542.
- Akhavan, Payam. (2005) "The Lord's Resistance Army case: Uganda's submission of the first state referral to the International Criminal Court." *American Journal of International Law* 99(2): 403-421.
- Blaydes, Lisa. (2018) *State of repression: Iraq under Saddam Hussein*. Princeton University Press.
- Braithwaite, John. (2002) *Restorative justice & responsive regulation*. Oxford University Press.
- Byman, Daniel. (2006) "Do targeted killings work." *Foreign Affairs* 85: 95.
- Canestaro, Nathan A. (2004) "Small wars and the law: Options for prosecuting the insurgents in Iraq." *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*. 43: 73.
- Carey, Sabine C., Michael P. Colaresi, and Neil J. Mitchell. (2015) "Governments, informal links to militias, and accountability." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(5): 850-876.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug. 2013. *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War*. Cambridge University Press.
- Chesney, Robert. (2010) "Who may be killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a case study in the international legal regulation of lethal force." *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law* 13: 3-60.
- Cobban, Helena. (2015) *Amnesty after atrocity?: Healing nations after genocide and war crimes*. Routledge.

- Cohen, Dara Kay, and Ragnhild Nordås. (2015) "Do states delegate shameful violence to militias? Patterns of sexual violence in recent armed conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(5): 877-898.
- Darley, John M., and Thane S. Pittman. (2003) "The psychology of compensatory and retributive justice." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 7(4): 324-336.
- Darley, John M., Kevin M. Carlsmith, and Paul H. Robinson. (2000) "Incapacitation and just deserts as motives for punishment." *Law and Human Behavior* 24(6): 659-683.
- Downes, Alexander B. (2007) "Draining the sea by filling the graves: Investigating the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence as a counterinsurgency strategy." *Civil Wars* 9(4): 420-444.
- Eck, Kristine, and Lisa Hultman. (2007) "One-sided violence against civilians in war: Insights from new fatality data." *Journal of Peace Research* 44(2): 233-246.
- Elster, Jon. (2004) *Closing the books: Transitional justice in historical perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gibson, James L. (2004) "Does truth lead to reconciliation? Testing the causal assumptions of the South African truth and reconciliation process." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2): 201-217.
- Guiora, Amos. (2004) "Targeted killing as active self-defense." *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 36: 319.
- Hafez, Mohammed M., and Joseph M. Hatfield. (2006) "Do targeted assassinations work? A multivariate analysis of Israel's controversial tactic during al-Aqsa uprising." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29(4): 359-382.
- Hicks, Madelyn Hsiao-Rei, Hamit Dardagan, Gabriela Guerrero Serdán, Peter M. Bagnall, John A. Sloboda, and Michael Spagat. (2011) "Violent deaths of Iraqi civilians, 2003–2008: analysis by perpetrator, weapon, time, and location." *PLoS medicine* 8(2): e1000415.
- Hood, Roger, and Carolyn Hoyle. (2015) *The death penalty: A worldwide perspective*. Oxford University Press.
- Human Rights Watch. 2017. Flawed Justice: Accountability for ISIS Crimes in Iraq. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/12/05/flawed-justice/accountability-isis-crimes-iraq#>
- Human Rights Watch. 2019. World Report: Iraq. <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/iraq>
- Jentzsch, Corinna, Stathis N. Kalyvas, and Livia Isabella Schubiger. (2015) "Militias in civil wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(5): 755-769.

- Jervis, Robert. (1978) "Cooperation under the security dilemma." *World Politics* 30(2): 167-214.
- Kessler, Oliver, and Wouter Werner. (2008) "Extrajudicial killing as risk management." *Security Dialogue* 39(2-3): 289-308.
- Koestler, Arthur. (2015) *Darkness at noon*. Simon and Schuster.
- Koren, Ore. (2017) "Means to an end: Pro-government militias as a predictive indicator of strategic mass killing." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34(5): 461-484.
- Koskenniemi, Martti. (2002) "Between impunity and show trials." *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* 6(1): 1-32.
- Kretzmer, David. (2005) "Targeted killing of suspected terrorists: Extra-judicial executions or legitimate means of defence?." *European Journal of International Law* 16(2): 171-212.
- Lyall, Jason. (2009) "Does indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? Evidence from Chechnya." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3): 331-362.
- McKelvey, Benjamin. (2011) "Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power." *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 44: 1353.
- Melzer, Nils. (2008) *Targeted killing in international law*. Oxford University Press.
- Mitchell, Neil J., Sabine C. Carey, and Christopher K. Butler. (2014) "The impact of pro-government militias on human rights violations." *International Interactions* 40(5): 812-836.
- Mundis, Daryl A. (2002) "The use of military commissions to prosecute individuals accused of terrorist acts." *American Journal of International Law* 96(2): 320-328.
- Murphy, Richard, and Afsheen John Radsan. (2009) "Due process and targeted killing of terrorists." *Cardozo Law Review* 31: 405.
- Olsen, Tricia, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter. (2010) "Transitional justice in balance." *Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy*. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace.
- Orentlicher, Diane F., and Robert Kogod Goldman. (2001) "When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions." *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy* 25: 653.
- Parker, Tom. (2005) "Prosecuting Saddam: the coalition provisional authority and the evolution of the Iraqi Special Tribunal." *Cornell International Law Journal* 38: 899.
- Posen, Barry R. (1993) "The security dilemma and ethnic conflict." *Survival* 35(1): 27-47.

Ramsden, Michael. (2011) "Targeted killings and international human rights law: the case of Anwar Al-Awlaki." *Journal of Conflict & Security Law* 16(2): 385-406.

Raynor, Peter, and Gwen Robinson. (2005) *Rehabilitation, crime and justice*. Springer.

Robinson, Gwen, and Iain D. Crow. (2009) *Offender rehabilitation: Theory, research and practice*. Sage.

Sambanis, Nicholas, Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, and Moses Shayo. (2012) "Parochialism as a central challenge in counterinsurgency." *Science* 336(6083): 805-808.

Smith, Brent L., Kelly R. Damphousse, Freedom Jackson, and Amy Sellers. (2002) "The prosecution and punishment of international terrorists in federal courts: 1980–1998." *Criminology & Public Policy* 1(3): 311-338.

Staniland, Paul. (2012) "Between a rock and a hard place: Insurgent fratricide, ethnic defection, and the rise of pro-state paramilitaries." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(1): 16-40.

Souleimanov, Emil Aslan, and David S. Siroky. (2016) "Random or retributive?: Indiscriminate violence in the chechen wars." *World Politics* 68(4): 677-712.

Staniland, Paul. (2012) "Between a rock and a hard place: Insurgent fratricide, ethnic defection, and the rise of pro-state paramilitaries." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(1): 16-40.

Szász, Béla. 1971. *Volunteers for the Gallows: Anatomy of a Show-trial*. London: Chatto and Windus.

Taub, Ben 2018. Iraq's Post-ISIS Campaign of Revenge. *The New Yorker*.
<https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/12/24/iraqs-post-isis-campaign-of-revenge>

Teitel, Ruti G. (2000) *Transitional justice*. Oxford University Press.

Teitel, Ruti G. (2015) *Globalizing transitional justice*. Oxford University Press.

Valentino, Benjamin, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay. (2004) "'Draining the sea': mass killing and guerrilla warfare." *International Organization* 58(2): 375-407.

Valentino, Benjamin A. (2014) "Why we kill: The political science of political violence against civilians." *Annual Review of Political Science* 17 (1): 89-103.

Wilson, Richard A. (2001) *The politics of truth and reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the post-apartheid state*. Cambridge University Press.

Appendix Table 1. Summary of Variables

Variable	Description	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Extrajudicial Vignette DV	Punishment preferences ranging from 1 = amnesty to 5 = death penalty	596	2.24	1.26	1	5
Judicial Killing DV	alpha score for perceptions of judicial fairness based on 5 post-treatment survey items*	596	2.87	0.92	1	4
ISIS concessions	alpha score for belief that ISIS will stop fighting if given concessions based on multiple survey items* 1 = definitely not to 4 = definitely yes*	596	2.14	0.99	1	4
Violence is justifiable	“It is sometimes necessary to use violence to support a just cause.” 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree	596	3.10	0.93	1	4
Will of the people	“The will of the people is more important than the rule of law.” 1 = strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree	594	2.76	1.03	1	4
Biased courts	“Court trials are biased against those suspected of supporting ISIS.” 1 = strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree	593	2.80	0.89	1	4
Death penalty just	“The death penalty is just for certain crimes.” 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree	596	3.22	1.04	1	4
Blame ISIS civilians	“To what extent do you blame ISIS civilian followers for ISIS crimes?” 1= not at all to 4 = a great deal	596	2.63	1.11	1	4
victimization	alpha score for ISIS victimization based on 9 survey items*	596	0.14	0.17	-0.11	0.78
female	1 = female respondent	596	0.22	0.41	0	1
age	Subject age in years	596	34.71	12.75	18	72
education	Education from no formal education to post-secondary	595	2.61	0.91	1	4
income	Income assessment ranges from 1 = Significant difficulties to 4 = cover expenses and save	596	2.13	0.93	1	4
Professional	1 = employer, manager, professional office worker	596	0.26	0.44	0	1
Laborer	1 = manual worker, farmer	596	0.33	0.47	0	1
Student	1 = student	596	0.24	0.43	0	1
unemployed	1 = currently unemployed	596	0.17	0.38	0	1

moved	0 = lived in Mosul throughout ISIS rule, 1 = moved at some point	596	0.18	0.38	0	1
-------	---	-----	------	------	---	---

*See online appendix for index construction details.