Toward a Posthumanist Understanding of Wartime Suffering: Public Concern for Animal Welfare in Ukraine, Forthcoming, Perspectives on Politics
The Recognition of Shared Suffering after Violence: ISIS Victimization and LGBT+ Support in Mosul Iraq,
Comparative Political Studies
While scholars have found that conflict-related victimization and exposure to violence can increase concern for the well-being of others, those effects have been largely circumscribed to in-group boundaries. Less clear is whether such empathy ‘born of suffering’ extends to stigmatized groups. We consider the case of public tolerance for LGBT+ people in Mosul Iraq, a city that experienced widespread violence under Islamic State (ISIS) occupation from 2014–2017, including targeted killings of LGBT+ people alongside other marginalized groups. Using original data from a 2021 survey experiment, we find that respondents are more supportive of protections for LGBT+ people when primed about ISIS persecution of LGBT+ groups. We observe that support also rises with experiences of personal victimization by ISIS. Our results speak to how conflict can potentially reduce out-group barriers through recognition of shared experiences of suffering, with implications for public acceptance of LGBT+-inclusive rights and protections in the aftermath of violence.
Going Public About Cyber Attacks: Public Threat Sensitivity and Support for Escalation in the United States and Russia. Journal of Cybersecurity
When governments go public with accusations of cyberattacks by rival powers, what impact does it have on public sensitivity to cyber threats and public demand for defensive or possibly offensive countermeasures? Based on an original survey experiment in nationwide surveys in the USA (N = 1336) and Russia (N = 2000) during May–June 2021, we find that Americans are more sensitive to cyberattacks than Russians, which could reflect greater US exposure to and government priming on foreign threats to cybersecurity. While both Russians and Americans prefer de-escalation over escalation in responding to cyberattacks, Americans are more willing than Russians to support escalation, including kinetic military options. To explain Americans’ increased inclination to escalate, we examine how threat sensitivity and beliefs about the justifiability of offensive actions are amplified when governments go public about cyberattacks from rivals. We discuss the implications of potential regime-type differences in threat sensitivity and response escalation for crises involving cyberattacks.
Legacies of Past and Present Violence: Evidences from Mosul, Iraq Journal of Conflict Resolution
Scholars are increasingly drawing attention to the societal consequences of conflict-related violence. What remains unclear is the interplay between short-term and long-term legacies of wartime traumas. We consider the case of Mosul, Iraq, a setting in which inhabitants have experienced wide-ranging victimization during both recent and historical contexts. In a 2022 survey, we inquired across a broad range of self-reported conflict experiences involving personal and kinship-based victimization including physical and sexual violence, property destruction, forced imprisonment, and displacement as a result of ISIS occupation. We also probed for victimization dating back to the Iran-Iraq War. Examining altruism toward other ISIS victims in a dictator game, we find that while ISIS-related victimization increases out-group empathy and reduces in-group bias in altruism, earlier conflict experiences exert independent influence as well. We consider the implications of our findings for conflict research involving multiple layers and sources of trauma and victimization.
Does pro-gay messaging from a celebrity athlete work in conservative contexts? Evidence from the Republic of Georgia Politics, Groups, and Identities
A growing consensus indicates that increasing visibility, awareness-raising, and positive media representations of gay people, through public advocacy and endorsements, contribute to tolerance and support. In particular, existing studies in the West show the promise of celebrity endorsements in promoting pro-gay attitudes. However, an emerging body of research, largely outside the West, points to potential backlash surrounding gay identity. We examine the efficacy of celebrity pro-gay endorsements. In an original survey experiment in Tbilisi, Georgia involving randomized pro-gay endorsements from a prominent Georgian football star, we find that a pro-gay celebrity endorsement reduces tolerance toward gay people. Our results have implications for the success of public messaging on gay identity in conservative social contexts.
Retribution versus Rehabilitation for Children within Insurgency: Public Attitudes Toward ISIS-Affiliated Youth in Mosul, Iraq Terrorism and Political Violence
In the aftermath of insurgent violence, how do people view the treatment of insurgent youth, from adolescent fighters to very young children? Using an original survey, we examine public opinion regarding adolescent/child soldiers and young children in the Islamic State (ISIS) in Mosul, Iraq. Focusing retrospectively, we inquire about rehabilitative versus retributive preferences for minors who fought and worked for the Islamic State relative to adults. We find that retributive preferences toward minors are conditioned on their participation in violence, beliefs about the determinants of adulthood, and the role of agency versus coercion in the recruitment process. Looking prospectively, we find the public divided between fears over the threat posed by radicalized children within insurgency and hope for their rehabilitation and reintegration. Our results raise concerns about the detrimental effects of retributive justice and social stigma on the well-being of insurgent youth and children both now and later into adulthood.
The Impact of U.S.-Russia Contestation over Gay Rights on Social Tolerance: Evidence from the Republic of Georgia International Journal of Public Opinion Research
Existing research draws attention to values clashes between Western and non-Western states, especially over LGBT+ identities and rights (Bob, 2012; Bob, 2019; Buyantueva, 2018; Inglehart, 2018; Van Herpen, 2016; Velasco, 2023; Weiss & Bosia, 2013). In such contestations, Western governments like the United States often deploy symbols of LGBT+ solidarity in societies where these rights are highly contested—a most visible example involving the periodic display of pride flags at U.S. embassies around the world to raise awareness and support for marginalized LGBT+ people in those countries. Meanwhile, non-Western governments like Russia often signal contempt for both LGBT+ symbolic recognition and rights in official public statements and actions. Our research considers the influence of such cultural clashes between foreign powers on public opinion toward gay people in contested spaces. We argue that liberal soft power strategies may backfire when met with public resistance to perceived Western incursion into domestic culture, reducing social tolerance toward gay people, especially when met with homophobic counter-narratives from soft power rivals.
Public Support for Power Grabs after Civil Conflict Security Studies
Power-sharing is a recognized strategy for reaching durable settlements among rivals. However, power-sharing arrangements are often violated when one side grabs power. We examine public perceptions of power-sharing versus power-grabbing in the context of local policing in Mosul, Iraq. In a survey experiment, we investigate if individuals believe that security in Mosul, in the aftermath of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) occupation, is enhanced or reduced under power-sharing versus power-grabbing treatments, which vary the authority held by distinct factions of the counter-ISIS coalition. The public is more likely to support power-grabbing than power-sharing in matters of policing and security. In the case of power-grabbing, there are also important moderating effects of conflict-related victimization. Unlike nonvictims who favor ingroup power-grabbing to enhance local sectarian control, victims place a premium on stability, welcoming even external, out-group control over power-sharing among groups who might be at odds. Our results underscore the challenges of institutionalizing power-sharing mechanisms for peacebuilding after conflict.
Gender, Agency, and Accountability for ISIS Violence: Public Perspectives from Mosul, Iraq Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
What role does gender play in public perceptions of accountability for terrorist and insurgency-related violence? Our research draws on the case of women in the Islamic State (ISIS) in Mosul, Iraq. We evaluate public opinion regarding punishment of ISIS-affiliated women among residents of Mosul as well as within internal displacement camps outside Mosul. We provide a theoretical framework for explaining how beliefs about women’s agency for violence relative to the justice system’s treatment of women factor into holding women accountable for violence. We find that people who recognize women’s agency favor harsher punishments, especially when the justice system is perceived as failing accountability expectations. Mosul residents, who are both more affirming of women’s agency for violence and dissatisfied with the judicial system’s treatment of women, are more punitive than those in the camps. Our research has implications for whether insurgent women will be allowed to re-enter society or face long-term public stigma and abuse.
Maintaining nonviolent selfdiscipline in hostile protest environments: evidence from the 2019 Baghdad protests Social Movement Studies
Successful civil resistance requires an enduring commitment to nonviolent selfdiscipline, often in response to repressive and provocative government tactics. We examine dedication to nonviolent collective action using the case of recent protests in Baghdad, Iraq. Based on a sample of 300 activists from 2019 anti-government protests across different locations in Baghdad, we find that those who have been exposed to violence by government forces are more willing to justify violent responses. However, more experienced protesters, reflected in present and past protest activity, display greater commitment to nonviolent activism and less willingness to reciprocate violence despite government provocations. We attribute this to possible socialization effects within activist communities which help transcend identity cleavages and associational divisions within the movement, reinforcing protest commitment and dedication to nonviolence. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for civil resistance as an alternative to violence in conflict-prone environments.
Waiting to Choose: The Role of Deliberation in Inter temporal Choice American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
We study the impact of deliberation on intertemporal choices. Using multiple experiments, including a field study in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, we show that the introduction of waiting periods—a policy that temporally separates information about choices from choices themselves—causes substantially less myopic decisions. These results cannot be captured by models of exponential discounting nor present bias. Comparing the effects of waiting periods to making planned choices over future time periods, the former has a larger impact on reducing myopia. Our results highlight the role of deliberation in decision-making and have implications for policy and intervention design.
Legacies of Stalin or Putin? Public Opinion and Historical Memory in Ukraine Political Research Quarterly
Our research considers the relationship between historical memory and political evaluations of the past and present. We first examine how historical reflection on the Soviet Union under Stalin is influenced by memories of familial suffering during World War II and victimization under the widespread Soviet gulag prison system. Based on a 2019 representative survey of Ukraine, we show that respondents who recall family members being injured or killed fighting during World War II and those who recount families being imprisoned in Soviet gulags have increased positive and negative appraisals of the Soviet Union under Stalin respectively. However, we also find that favorable opinions of Stalin are strongly predicted by approval of Vladimir Putin, who has actively promoted rehabilitation of Stalin’s legacy to bolster personalist rule at home and justify revisionist agendas abroad, including in Ukraine. Our results underscore interactions between the present and past in shaping historical memory such that what appears as enduring legacies of the past could also be a function of present political circumstances.
Due Process and Accountability Under Transitional Justice: Evidence from Mosul, Iraq Journal of Conflict Resolution
Do citizens care about due process rights when holding insurgent groups accountable for violence? We examine public perceptions of justice and fairness in judicial proceedings brought against suspected Islamic State (ISIS) militants and their supporters in Mosul, Iraq. We conducted a survey of Mosul residents and people in ISIS-affiliated displacement camps outside Mosul to evaluate public support for detainee due process rights. Using a trial and punishment survey experiment, we find that Mosul residents, while favoring capital punishment for ISIS involvement, are also sensitive to procedural due process rights of the accused. People with self-reported ISIS affiliations, in contrast, are more concerned with substantive due process, and do not see capital punishment outcomes as fair, regardless of procedural considerations. Although rebel group sympathizers and opponents have clashing perspectives on what constitutes equitable punishment for participation in insurgency, both recognize the importance of due process rights to long-term peace and security.
Public Tolerance of Retributive Violence Against Insurgencies International Studies Quarterly
What drives public support for retributive violence against insurgents, a desire for revenge or security? We consider the case of suspected Islamic State (ISIS) militants in Mosul Iraq. Using survey experiments, we inquire about public support for judicial as well as extrajudicial violence against insurgent combatants. We sample among ordinary civilians in Mosul who lived under ISIS rule as well as ISIS-affiliated families in displacement camps outside Mosul. We find that many Mosul civilians are highly tolerant of retributive violence against insurgents, but this tolerance is driven primarily by security concerns rather than revenge. In contrast, others, especially in displacement camps, oppose the punitive killing of insurgents because they regard such actions as counterproductive to long-term security goals. This tension speaks to potential security dilemmas surrounding retaliatory responses to insurgency. Instead, public security interests may be better served through nonviolent strategies, to include negotiations with insurgent forces and more restorative approaches to justice.
Rebel Group Attrition and Reversion to Violence: Micro-Level Evidence from Syria International Studies Quarterly
Why might former rebel combatants ever revert to fighting? The purpose of this research note is to inform the scholarly community on rebel incentives to remobilize for violence, a topic which has been underexplored in the literature, using evidence from an ongoing conflict: the case of volunteer ex-combatants in the Syrian civil war. In late 2014 to early 2015, we conducted surveys with 196 ex-fighters who served with different rebel group brigades linked to the Free Syrian Army as well as moderate Islamist and jihadist groups. Interviews were conducted in Gaziantep, Turkey, a common destination for combatants exiting the battlefield in rebel-held territory in northern Syria. We find that ex-fighters who are ideologically committed to the defeat of the Assad regime and/or the establishment of an Islamic state are most likely to want to return to combat. However, rebel group organizational deficiencies and strategies keep many highly motivated fighters away. Our results illustrate how rebel fighters might quickly remobilize when disciplined, well-organized rebel groups emerge on the scene, as evidenced by the rapid ascent of the Islamic State (ISIS).
Commitment to Rebellion: Evidence from Syria Journal of Conflict Resolution
What sustains commitment to rebel fighting during civil war? Using original survey data from the ongoing conflict in Syria, we examine whether self-ascribed rebel fighters, former fighters, civilians, and refugees can be clearly differentiated based on commitment to rebellion. We ask whether such groups are better characterized as a broadly holistic fighting community or a heterogeneous mix of actors with different levels of support for violence. Using a well-balanced sample of over 300 active and former rebel fighters, civilians from within the conflict zone, and externally displaced refugees, we observe that fighting commitment is greater among active combatants compared to other cohorts. To understand why, we examine underexplored psychological mechanisms and find that individuals with higher risk tolerance, optimism bias, and identity fusion with rebel forces display greater dedication to fighting. We discuss the implications of our results for understanding who participates in civil war violence and why.
Mobilizing civilians into high-risk forms of violent collective action Journal of Peace Research
We consider whether prior political activism increases the likelihood of engaging in higher-risk forms of violent collective action. We test our hypothesis in the context of the 2014 Euromaidan and subsequent separatist violence in Eastern Ukraine. In the aftermath of the Euromaidan protests, the Ukrainian government began a widespread campaign to mobilize young men for military service against separatist movements in the Donbas region amid escalating tensions with Russia. In July 2014, we survey young men who were volunteering to join the Ukrainian military’s counterinsurgency efforts and compare them to other young men who live in the same community but had not volunteered. Using a case control study design, we interviewed 100 young men who reported to a local Ukrainian army recruitment station in Kharkiv, a city in Eastern Ukraine which was an important center for military recruitment efforts. We compared them to 100 other young men who lived in the same communities, received recruitment notices, but had chosen not to report. Military recruits were sampled by cluster-sampling at the recruitment station, with random selection of recruits by cluster. Civilian males were sampled by random route in the vicinity of the recruitment station. When comparing survey responses between recruits and civilians, we find strong linkages between prior Euromaidan participation and military mobilization. Our results are robust to controls for parochial ethnocentrism and mere support for Euromaidan goals. Maidan participation and military mobilization are also correlated with a strong sense of self-efficacy, optimism, risk tolerance, patriotic nationalism, and feelings of in-group solidarity with protesters and the military. These correlates illustrate plausible mechanisms for how individuals could transition to increasingly higher-cost, higher-risk forms of collective action.
Risk Tolerance during Conflict: Evidence from Aleppo, Syria Journal of Peace Research
When war breaks out, how important are risk preferences to explaining why some individuals stay in conflict zones while others take flight? We examine risk tolerance among rebel combatants and civilians in Aleppo, Syria using a variation of the Eckel-Grossman Choice Game. Field work in Syria was conducted in 2013–14 with a total of 232 participants to include both Syrian civilians and active rebel fighters in Aleppo and Idlib Province, as well as among Syrian refugees in neighboring Turkey. Compared to Syrians in other locations, people in rebel-held territory of Aleppo, both combatants and non-combatants, are significantly more risk tolerant. We consider possible explanations for elevated risk preferences in Aleppo based on self-selection, adaptive learning, a sense of self-efficacy to affect future outcomes, conflict-related grievances, and in-group solidarity. Our analysis suggests that self-selection based on access to resources and a strong sense of self-efficacy may explain higher propensity for risk-taking. Overall, our results speak to a plausible sorting mechanism during conflict where risk averse individuals select out of conflict, while highly risk tolerant individuals are more prone to discount the inherent dangers of remaining in conflict zones. Our results provide new micro-level explanation for why some societies become mired in conflict traps involving highly risk tolerant fighting communities.
The economic consequences of political alienation: Ethnic minority status and investment behavior in a post-conflict society World Development
How does minority status influence individual investment and savings decisions in a post-conflict society? We argue that minority status is associated with lower trust in third-party institutions controlled by an ethnic out-group, and, as a result, leads to a preference for certain earnings over potentially risky investments. We test this hypothesis with multiple sources of evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, we experimentally elicit investment behavior among members of the same ethnic group on two sides of the boundary that makes some individuals majorities and others minorities. Second, we induce minority status in the lab. Analyses across the studies show that both natural and induced minority statuses lead to lower levels of investment. We provide ecological validity to the experimental results with the analysis of a large, representative household survey and an original survey of businessmen. The results have large implications for understanding of inter-ethnic relations and the sense of security in development.
Social Norms after Conflict Exposure and Victimization by Violence British Journal of Political Science
An emerging literature points to the heterogeneous effects of violence on social norms and preferences in conflict-ridden societies. This article considers how responses to violence could be affected by in-group/out-group divisions. The research uses lab-in-the-field experiments to gauge norms for pro-social behavior in the aftermath of ethnic violence in post-war Kosovo. The study finds that one set of treatments (ethnicity) captures a negative legacy of violence on parochialism, while another (local/non-local) shows stronger evidence of pro-sociality and norm recovery. Examining individual variation in conflict exposure, it finds that victims of violence are more biased against ethnic out-groups and less pro-social to others outside of their local community. Balancing and matching on observables helps alleviate concerns that the results are driven by selection bias on victimization. Overall, the results suggest that the effects of violence may be contingent on the salience of in-group/out-group cues and boundaries.
International Peacekeeping and Positive Peace: Evidence from Kosovo Journal of Conflict Resolution
To what extent can international peacekeeping promote micro-foundations for positive peace after violence? Drawing on macro-level peacekeeping theory, our approach uses novel experimental methods to illustrate how monitoring and enforcement by a neutral third party could conceivably enhance prosocial behavior between rival groups in a tense, postconflict peacekeeping environment. Using a laboratory experiment in postwar Kosovo, we find that third-party enforcement is more effective at promoting norms of trust between ethnic Serbs and Albanians than monitoring alone or no intervention at all. We then consider real-world extensions for building positive peace across different intervention environments. Using a dictator experiment that exploits heterogeneity in NATO peacekeeping in different regions of Kosovo, our inferences about monitoring and enforcement appear robust to ecological conditions in the field.
The Evolution of Prosociality and Parochialism after Violence Journal of Peace Research
To what extent can prosocial norms (re-)emerge among rival groups following intense intergroup conflict? One school of thought posits that violence can strengthen intragroup bonding norms, entrenching parochialism and sustaining in-group biases. However, recent studies suggest that intergroup bridging norms can also improve once conflict ends. Our research offers insights into how prosocial bridging vs. parochial bonding norms evolve after violence. To measure dynamics of social norms, we employ surveys and dictator game experiments with ethnic treatments which we administered in Bosnia in 2003 and replicated in 2013 using well-balanced samples of ethnic Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs in a difference-in-difference research design. We find that prosocial bridging norms improve over time. However, we also observe persistent parochial biases in terms of how in-groups are perceived and treated relative to out-groups. Regression analysis shows that intergroup bridging norms are more salient among individuals who reside in ethnically intermixed, institutionally integrated regions of Bosnia, including those who experienced traumatic forms of wartime victimization. Covariate matching on internal displacement and victimization reduces concerns that our results are driven by selection effects. Our findings lend support to the view that integration and intergroup contact among former rivals increases prosociality while partition and social segregation encourage parochialism.
Ethnicity and Altruism After Violence: The Contact Hypothesis in Kosovo Journal of Experimental Political Science
An enduring question for the social sciences is whether increasing contact and exposure between in-groups and out-groups enhances prospects for social tolerance and cooperation. Using dictator experiments with ethnic Serbs in post-war Kosovo, our research explores how norms of altruism are impacted by proximity to former rivals. In the aftermath of violence, proximity appears to amplify solidarity with the in-group but also increases empathy toward former adversaries. Based on a March 2011 study of 158 ethnic Serbs from regions across Kosovo with varying degrees of contact and separation from ethnic Albanians, we find that both out-group bridging and in-group bonding norms increase with exposure to the out-group. The inclusion of extended controls and matching for displacement by violence and other forms of victimization helps alleviate concerns about sorting and selection driving our results.
Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
How do nationalistic media affect animosity between ethnic groups? We consider one of Europe’s deadliest conflicts since WWII, the Serbo-Croatian conflict. We show that, after a decade of peace, cross-border nationalistic Serbian radio triggers ethnic hatred toward Serbs in Croatia. Mostly attracted by nonpolitical content, many Croats listen to Serbian public radio (intended for Serbs in Serbia) whenever signal is available. As a result, the vote for extreme nationalist parties is higher and ethnically offensive graffiti are more common in Croatian villages with Serbian radio reception. A laboratory experiment confirms that Serbian radio exposure causes anti-Serbian sentiment among Croats.
Inter-group Contact and Out-Group Altruism After Violence Journal of Economic Psychology
Altruism among humans is common. It is especially prominent among in-group members. However, we are struck by results from laboratory-in-the-field experiments with out-group members of different ethnic or religious backgrounds. In all instances, the groups were rivals in civil wars. While we find almost no altruistic behavior among groups that were engaged in fighting, out-group altruism emerges with the passage of time. To address the underlying mechanism that might explain this puzzling result, we use a laboratory experiment that sorts between a norms revision explanation and a contact hypothesis explanation. Our findings show that contact with out-group members, in a mutually beneficial task, results in a reversion to prior levels of out-group altruism following conflict. Our findings reinforce the idea that deeply held attitudes toward a stigmatized out-group change following productive interactions with those out-group members. It is clear that hostility between groups need not persist over time.
Conflict and Parochialism Among Combatants and Civilians: Evidence from Ukraine Journal of Economic Psychology
How does conflict affect prosocial and parochial preferences within a society? Our research considers the case of recent violence in Donbas, Ukraine where ethnic Russian separatists are battling the Ukrainian military. To evaluate social preferences, we utilize a non-costly dictator game with ethnic treatments among young ethnic Ukrainian male combatants and noncombatants in the eastern city of Kharkiv, which borders the Donbas region. At the onset of violence, we find no differences in how these men treat ethnic Russians in their local community compared to their own in-group. However, after a year of intense fighting with separatists in the nearby Donbas region, we find evidence of the erosion of fairness preferences and increased bias against ethnic Russians, especially among noncombatant civilians, underscoring how parochial responses to violence may extend beyond direct combat exposure mechanisms. Our results point to the short-term destabilizing effects of conflict on prosocial preferences with potential long-term consequences for entrenching parochial divisions.
Who Are the ISIS People? Perspectives on Terrorism
By definition, an “armed group” is a group of individuals which threatens or uses violence to achieve its goals.[1]
And while a significant body of academic and policy research is looking at the “violence” aspect of the definition,
trying to understand why and how groups engage in violence, the “group” aspect of it (the people involved) often
receives less attention. Yet without the people, there is no group and, as a result, no one to conduct those acts of
violence. So to truly understand the prospects of an armed group like ISIS in the future, we need to understand
what we can about their cadre, in particular: 1) who ISIS 1.0 members were, 2) who among them survived and
what are their plans, and 3) who could potentially be inspired by the group’s proposed goals in the future. By
understanding these issues, it becomes easier to develop better policies for discouraging current members from
continuing operations (“de-radicalization”) and for preventing new people from joining.